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ABSTRACT 
Cohesion policy micro-efficiency is determined by the institutional or absorption capacity of 
recipient regions and Member States. This, in turn, co-determines the policy’s macro-economic 
impact. The analysis shows that Cohesion policy is not perceived as an “EU receipts maximising 
instrument”, but instead that it is understood as a means to the set objectives, i.e. that it is 
about the genuine impact. At the same time, however, the analysis also shows that proper 
change to implementation systems is needed. The paper puts forward four proposals for 
improvements. The most radical of them, the ‘coordinated full decentralisation’ option, 
conceives Cohesion policy as a bulk transfer of investment-conditioned financial resources, 
where full responsibility for the legality, regularity, efficiency and effectiveness would be 
entirely transferred to the Member States/regional level while, at the same time, preserving 
Cohesion policy as a genuine European policy. The analysis reveals that the subsidiarity 
principle is still not taken into account to a satisfactory degree, that experience and political 
context have significant influence on the (optimal) design of implementation systems and 
finally that, on average, there seems to be merit in concentration both with regard to the 
number of operational programmes (less so for their thematic focus) as well as to the number 
of institutions involved in the implementation systems, horizontally and especially vertically. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There is a growing body of literature reviewing the macro-effectiveness of Cohesion policy, 
whose, admittedly mixed conclusions, nevertheless give a strong signal that Cohesion policy 
impact is conditional on good management practices or, more generally, on the 
institutional or absorption capacity of the recipient regions and Member States. Absorption 
capacity thus seems to determine what we call the micro-efficiency of the policy. This is the 
focus of this paper, with the ambition systematically to identify those institutional 
arrangements at every step of the policy cycle which contribute to an efficient and effective 
Cohesion policy implementation system. Ultimately, the findings could possibly be used both to 
improve the implementation systems, as well as for the reform of the regulatory framework in 
which Cohesion policy operates. 
The systematic analysis of the paper makes use of existing evaluations and complements them 
with the conclusions from an extended EU-wide questionnaire, which was prepared specifically 
as a basis for this paper. The questionnaire has been structured around the standard phases of 
the policy cycle and, for each phase a critical assessment has been made of present practices. 
This often required preparation of relevant typologies, due to different practices in different 
systems. On this basis, it has been possible to survey respondents’ views on how 
implementation systems could be made more efficient and effective. The questionnaire has 
been completed only by people who have direct experience of Cohesion policy management. 
Research undertaken has also benefited from the author’s first-hand experience of Cohesion 
policy management, as he was directly responsible for the Structural and Cohesion Funds 
implementation in the Slovenian Managing Authority. 
The results on the criteria that need to be taken into account when devising a strategy for the 
use of Cohesion policy resources, indicate that this policy is not perceived as an “EU receipts 
maximising instrument”, but instead that Cohesion policy is understood as a means for 
delivering set objectives, i.e. about the genuine impact which the operational programmes 
have been devised to bring. However, the implementation systems, according to the 
respondents, not only need simplification, but proper change. The reasons for such a 
conclusion are not based only on the findings by the European Court of Auditors, which has 
reported control failures in all of the audited programmes, but also on the following 
arguments: (a) the time needed from project idea to project start in a modern, globalized 
world is unacceptably long; in fact, time management in general represents a fundamental 
weakness of Cohesion policy implementation systems; (b) there is universal agreement that the 
system is over-controlled, which holds true both at the national as well as EU levels; and (c) 
the management costs on the side of administration and project holders were estimated to be 
as high as 15% of total costs, which would translate to a soaring €61 billion over the period of 
the financial perspective and potential savings of €4 billion for every percentage point 
reduction in administration costs. Before looking at the possible improvements put forward in 
the paper, it is worth mentioning that the respondents attribute 55% of all administrative 
procedures to the EU legislation and requirements. Thus, even though the recipient Member 
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States and regions clearly bear major responsibility for designing the administrative procedures 
which are streamlined, straightforward and adapted to the needs of beneficiaries, reform is 
clearly needed also at the EU level. 
The possible improvements are presented in the order of the extent to which they could 
improve the system. However, this is simultaneously inversely correlated with the ease with 
which reforms could be introduced. 
• Among the milder improvements to the system is a significantly more extended use of 
the proportionality principle. It has been demonstrated that smaller projects tend to 
be more demanding in terms of management requirements and are thus associated with 
a greater administrative burden per monetary unit spent. In turn, this translates into 
staffing costs not being dependent on funding levels, but on the number of projects 
instead. This principle has already been introduced in the Regulations (Art. 13 of the 
Regulation No. 1083/2006), but it is still rather unclear how extensively it will be used 
or rather how extensively the control and audit institutions will allow it to be 
implemented. 
• The second possible change is an ‘augmented strategy based on administrative costs’. 
Taking into account that the administrative costs of (for example) ESF type operations 
are, on average, almost twice as high as Cohesion Fund operations, that the EU 
instruments are significantly more administratively-demanding than national ones, and 
that Cohesion policy resources only represent a limited share of total public capital 
expenditures, the Cohesion policy impact could be improved by re-focusing the EU 
resources on operations which are cheaper to implement, while the rest would be 
financed through national policies only. Such commitment could be contract-based or 
established on the basis of the open method of coordination approach.  
• Third, ‘overcontrol’ and rigid interpretations of the regulations are also the result of 
the manner in which controls and audits are performed - i.e. increasingly risk-averse 
practices, combined with uncoordinated institutions, tend to give rise to practices that 
put more focus on procedures rather than on content. Thus, new agreement is needed 
among all the stakeholders on how Cohesion policy will be implemented; the institution 
of ‘contracts of confidence’ could (amongst others) be used for such a change. At the 
same time, it is possible that contracts of confidence could, in practice, make national 
control and audit institutions even more, not less, rigid. As a result this instrument 
could also work to the detriment of increased efficiency. There are reasons, however, 
to expect that the possible improvements based on the this approach, which in 
principle could be introduced immediately, would be limited, due to the restrictive 
provisions set by Cohesion policy’s regulatory environment. Thus a more significant 
departure from the present concept of how Cohesion policy is implemented could be 
conceived, whereby disbursement of funds would be based on agreed outcomes and 
results instead of on verification of invoices. 
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• Lastly, a possibly complementary, and more fundamental approach to reform would be 
to reduce the number of institutions involved in Cohesion policy, and to address the 
multi-level governance problem head-on. A ‘coordinated full decentralisation’ option 
would conceive Cohesion policy as a bulk transfer of investment-conditioned financial 
resources, where full responsibility for the legality, regularity, efficiency and 
effectiveness would be entirely transferred to the Member State/regional level. The EU 
perspective would continue to be ensured through a very strategic ‘programme’, 
prepared by the recipient areas and agreed with the European Commission. 
Furthermore, the European Commission would continue to monitor the progress made 
by the Member States (e.g. on the basis of core indicators and financial indicators), 
which would allow monitoring and evaluation of the Cohesion policy impact as a whole. 
Such an approach would preserve Cohesion policy as a genuine European policy, but 
would, at the same time, radically reduce Cohesion policy administration costs, 
without any detriment to the effectiveness of the resources used.  
In fact, it could be argued both on theoretical grounds, as well as on the answers of the 
questionnaire respondents, that the impact of Cohesion policy under the coordinated full 
decentralisation option would actually improve. According to the questionnaire research, the 
subsidiarity principle is currently not taken into account to a satisfactory degree, and this 
holds true both for the EU vs. Member States relationship, as well as for the national vs. 
regional level relationship, the latter only in the EU12, while in the EU15 the present balance is 
considered to be more or less optimal. In fact, the respondents still attribute 48% of the 
decision-making power on operational programmes to the European Commission, while their 
optimal share is considered to be a much lower 29%, which gives a strong signal for further 
decentralisation of decision-making power. In a similar vein, there seems to be overwhelming 
support for additional decentralisation of project-level decision-making in the EU12 to the 
regional level, where the respondents (on average) considered the optimal relationship 
between the national and regional level to be 50:50; currently only 35% of the project decision-
making is attributed to the regional level. 
The analysis also reveals that experience and political context matter. Even though separate 
coordination could prove to be ineffective for self-standing policies, the newly introduced 
systems need a strong coordinating institution, with significant decision-making powers for 
whatever the policy in question. With time, when the system and relationships among 
institutions become standardised and well established, there seems to be greater scope for a 
loosening of central coordination. The learning period also seems to be very important for the 
improved efficiency of the public administration managing the funds, as EU12 Member States 
see public administrations as a much more pronounced problem than do the EU15 Member 
States. Countries and regions with longer experience, better know-how, as well as longer 
democratic traditions and therefore greater trust in politics, seem to accept more subjectivity 
in the project selection processes, i.e. they are more conducive to open calls, which allow for 
more innovation and less administratively intensive procedures. Where this is not the case, 
preference seems to be given to stricter, more quantified approaches, where the political 
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sphere has less room for intervention. This is particularly obvious for strategic project selection 
processes, which should be used only in cases where the project is ‘quasi-monopolised’ in 
nature (either because of the nature of the activity or because of the single possible 
beneficiary) or where successful project implementation requires such a broad scope of 
partners that the competition would be meaningless or that the administrative costs would be 
prohibitive. Furthermore, there seems to be a universally low approval rate for decision-making 
based on direct government decision, while the EU12 Member States generally do not seem to 
trust single authorities, as they seem to see greater assurance in broader institutional 
involvement in the appraisal process. 
Finally, on average, there seems to be merit in concentration both with regard to the number 
of operational programmes (less so for their thematic focus) and the number of institutions 
involved in the implementation systems, horizontally and, especially, vertically. Nevertheless, 
there seem to be three horizontal guiding principles which contribute to the efficiency of any 
implementation system: first, the implementation systems need to allow and promote 
flexibility and adaptability to changed circumstances, as well as new, innovative approaches in 
particular policy fields, i.e. a managing authority needs to retain the jurisdiction and 
mechanism to reallocate the money to new instruments or new intermediate bodies; second, 
an incentive mechanism that promotes competition and thus allocates money to the best-
performing intermediate bodies is clearly conducive to efficiency; and lastly, the intermediate 
bodies to which the money is allocated need to be accountable and need the proper 
institutional capacity to implement the activities entrusted to them by the managing authority, 
which requires careful contracting. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The regional policy of the European Union, commonly termed Cohesion policy, has an 
overall budget of €347 billion (in current prices) for the period 2007-2013, representing 
approximately 35.6% of the overall budget. Yet, in terms of GDP, the foreseen spending 
allocations are actually diminishing so that the gap with the peak year of 1999, when 
almost 0.5% of GDP was spent on this policy, looks quite large. Considering the 2004 and 
2007 enlargement to include the significantly less-developed EU12 Member States, this is a 
somewhat surprising trend, although improved convergence trends on the level of the 
Member States could represent an argument that the allocated resources are in fact 
sufficient to start a virtuous cycle of economic development in the lagging regions and 
Member States. 
Given the severe public finance constraints, increasing attention has been put on the actual 
effectiveness of Cohesion policy. Admittedly, the European Commission itself has given the 
evaluation of the policy very high priority, rendering the evaluation principle one of the 
building blocks of Cohesion policy. This has been the case since the substantial reform in 
1989, but further attention is being given to this area in the 2007-2013 period. Due to a 
strengthened decentralisation of responsibilities from the EU level to the Member States on 
the basis of the so-called ‘strategic approach’, which means delegation of daily 
management issues to the Member States and only strategic issues to be dealt with on the 
EU level, the importance of evaluation will, almost by definition, increase further still. It is 
on this basis that the Commission intends to defend its role as the ‘caretaker of the EC 
budget’ (Art. 274 of the Treaty) and also be able to report on the policy’s results to the 
European Parliament.  
There is a growing body of literature looking at the macro-effectiveness of Cohesion policy; 
the conclusions, however, are by no means straightforward. The conclusions are, to an 
important degree, conditioned by the research methodology used, as well as by the time 
period and Member States under investigation (Ederveen et al, 2006, Bradley, forthcoming). 
There seems to be consensus, however, that the impact is conditional on good management 
practices or, more generally, on the institutional or absorption capacity of the recipient 
regions and Member States. Absorption capacity thus seems to determine the so-called 
efficiency of the policy on the micro-level, which is also the focus of this paper. Absorption 
capacity is a broader concept than administrative absorption capacity as put forward by 
Boot, de Vet and Feekes (2002) and further developed by Mrak and Wostner (2004), as it 
refers to the quality of the whole development policy cycle (Fitzgerald and Promé, 1996): 
from planning to project generation and selection, to implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of development activities. Administrative absorption capacity by public 
administration, on the other hand, refers only to handling the EU resources and, on the part 
of recipients, to their ability to fulfil the administrative requirements for making eligible 
expenditure and therefore public co-financing. 
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There is limited research into what exactly micro-level efficiency refers to and especially 
what it depends on. On the one hand, there are quite a large number of evaluations which 
focus on analysis and recommendations of particular circumstances of particular regions. 
There is a widespread conviction that there is “no single, universally applicable model that 
holds true for all cases and situations” (ÖIR, 2003: 21). These evaluations are, therefore, 
looking for efficiency improvements on the basis of particular implementation system 
problems and possible threats. There has been less insight, however, into the systematic 
properties of the Cohesion policy implementation systems in general. This is the focus of 
this paper, whose ambition is to identify systematically those institutional arrangements 
at every step of the policy cycle, which contribute to an efficient and effective 
Cohesion policy implementation system. 
This paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, the second section presents the 
relevant studies and evaluations, which address both theoretically and empirically the issue 
of the micro-efficiency of Cohesion policy. It starts with more general studies, proceeds 
with the more specific presentation of the absorption capacity concept and then continues 
with the presentation of more detailed studies. Section three presents the methodology of 
the paper. A step-by-step, detailed analysis can be found in Section four on ‘factors 
determining micro-efficiency’. This section first presents the framework conditions for the 
implementation of Cohesion policy, as well as the choices that Member States and regions 
are faced with as far as general structuring of the implementation systems is concerned. 
This is followed by the analysis of efficiency factors in each phase of the policy cycle: 
programming, project generation, appraisal and selection, financial management and 
controls and monitoring and evaluation. Section five concludes the paper. 
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2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
One of the most comprehensive analyses in the field is a study prepared in the framework 
of the Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, commissioned by European 
Commission, DG Regional Policy and performed by ÖIR in association with LRDP and IDOM in 
2003. The study’s focus was to “explore implementation processes and .... to identify what 
works well and why and what unnecessary complexities could be simplified” (ÖIR, 2003: 7). 
It is based on 153 in-depth interviews with people responsible for Structural Funds 
implementation in 18 case-study regions, all of which were from the EU15. The authors 
recognised that, in spite of the same set of rules on the European level, the actual delivery 
mechanisms vary significantly both among different Members States, and even among 
regions within the same Member States. 
For this purpose, a common methodology was used3, which focused on three sets of so-
called macro-factors that, in the author’s opinion, critically determined the efficiency of 
the implementation systems. These are: (a) actors; (b) context and rules; and (c) 
procedures and systems. Through a systematic procedure under each of these macro-
factors, more specific and particular factors and implementation mechanisms were 
identified as presented in Table 1. 
For each of the factors, a quantitative assessment of the impact was determined on the 
basis of the interviews. These focused on: 
a) identification of the direction of impact on efficiency of the Structural Funds 
(positive / negative); and 
b) identification of the intensity of impact (low / high). 
In order to take account of different case study contexts, additional indicators (statements) 
were identified. For each of these indicators, the evaluator assigned one of the 4 values (0, 
0.25, 0.5 or 1.04), where 0 means that the indicator has not been achieved and 1 means 
that it was fully achieved. 
This comprehensive analysis will serve as an excellent benchmark for our own analysis since 
the two are complementary. The ÖIR study focuses, first, on the identification of critical 
factors that influence efficiency of the Structural Funds implementation systems and 
secondly, it wants to recognise the actual situation in the regions. During the interviews, of 
course, attention was also given to how the systems should be improved, but this was not 
systematically quantified. This will serve as an excellent basis for our study since its focus 
                                                 
3 This is itself based on a method developed by the Instituto per lo sviluppo della formazione 
professionale dei lavoratori (ISFOL), ESF Evaluation unit in Italy. 
4 It is not clear or explained why also the value 0.75 was not foreseen. 
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is particularly on the optimal institutional / administrative arrangements most conductive 
to efficient implementation of the Structural Funds.  
Table 1: Factors and implementation mechanisms as identified in the ÖIR study 
Actors Context 
Rules, Procedures & Technical 
Support 
1. The Commission – Policies, 
Priorities and Organisation 
11. Political Context 17. Measures to implement EU 
Regulations and Procedures 
2. National Government – Policies, 
Priorities and Organisation 
12. Socio-Economic context 18. Programming 
3. Regional/Federal Government – 
Policies, Priorities and Organisation 
13. Administrative Structures 19. Management Procedures 
4. Monitoring Committees – Policies, 
Priorities and Organisation 
14. Institutional Structures 20. Control Systems and 
Procedures 
5. Managing Authorities – 
Organisation 
15. Forms of Intervention 21. Development and use of 
monitoring system 
6. Paying Authorities - Organisation 16. Future of EU – Enlargement 22. Development and use of 
evaluation system 
7. Implementing Bodies – 
Organisation 
23. Assessment and selection of 
Projects 
8. Beneficiaries – Organisation 24. Financial Procedures 
9. Social Partners – Priorities, 
organisation 
25. Partnership 
10. External Experts – reports 26. Coordination 
27. Measures to ensure 
Information and Publicity 
28. Relationships between MA 
and Implementing Bodies 
29. Technical Assistance 
 
 
30. Other monitoring activities of 
programme implementation 
Source: ÖIR 2003: 30 
The main ÖIR studies findings in terms of positive Structural Funds implementation system 
features are the following (what has worked well): 
i. The programming process is of significant value in the generation of harmonised 
development strategies between central and regional authorities. 
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ii. The management structures that have been put in place to support the 
implementation process. 
iii. The use of specialist intermediary bodies for project implementation. The use of 
global grants has greatly enhanced the efficiency of Funds utilisation in a manner 
that is appropriate for local and regional development needs. 
iv. The use of ex-ante and mid-term evaluations is seen as greatly enhancing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation process. The trend towards the 
use of ‘ongoing evaluations’ is seen as a useful approach. 
v. Provisions for the disbursement of funds on the basis of payments made rather than 
commitments is seen as increasing the absorption rates within the programmes. 
On the negative side, the following critical elements were recognised (what has not 
worked).  
i. The long approval process for programming documents. 
ii. While there is universal agreement about the need for monitoring as an important 
dimension to accountability, there is little evidence that the outcomes of the 
monitoring system are being fed back into the management process. 
iii. Financial flows are considered to be very long and complex. This is frequently not a 
result of the regulations themselves but rather to national and regional 
interpretation of these regulations. 
iv. Financial control mechanisms are characterised as being risk averse in the extreme, 
with no built-in risk management model. 
v. The 7% advance of funds is seen as too little and too slow by project promoters. 
This reflects more on the transfer of funds within the Member States and regions 
than from the Commission to the Member State. 
vi. There is evidence of the existence of double accounting systems in a number of 
regions. 
vii. There are too many audits of a very exhaustive nature from a variety of different 
actors. 
viii. The application of the N+2 rule in an indiscriminate way is seen as working against 
innovation and quality. There is a need for flexibility with regard to these. 
Examples would include transnational and interregional projects, involving partners 
from a number of different States and regions, requiring significant coordination 
and adaptation to different political, legal, administrative contexts. 
ix. Proportionality is an issue at programme and project level; implementation rules 
are applied in the same way for large programmes and large projects as for small 
ones. 
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x. The completion of the previous programming periods is seen as taking too long, and 
the ex post evaluation is of no use in preparing for the following period. 
xi. There is not enough attention paid to providing project promoters with easily 
understandable information on the process and educating them to be able to take 
full advantage. 
The analysis by Boot et al, 2001, is the first systematically to put forward the notion of 
absorption capacity. It has defined it as “the extent to which a member state is able to 
fully spend in an effective and efficient way the allocated financial resources from the 
Structural Funds” (Boot et al, 2001: 11). On this basis three more specific factors of 
absorption capacity have been established. 
1. The macroeconomic absorption capacity, which would be defined and measured in 
terms of GDP; 
2. The managerial-administrative absorption capacity which refers to the abilities 
and skills of central, regional and local authorities to prepare acceptable plans, 
programmes, and projects in due time, to decide on programmes and projects, to 
arrange the co-ordination among the principal partners, to cope with the vast 
amount of administrative and reporting paperwork required by the Commission, 
and to finance and supervise implementation properly, avoiding fraud as far as 
possible. 
3. The financial absorption capacity, which refers to the ability to co-finance EU 
supported programmes and projects, to plan and guarantee these national 
contributions in multi-annual budgets, and to collect these contributions from 
several partners involved in a programme or project. 
Along the same lines Mrak and Wostner (2004) further developed the concept of 
administrative capacity. In particular, they have specified more precisely the necessary 
conditions to ensure disbursement of EU funds to the recipient regions / Member States. 
They put forward the following factors. 
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1.) Real absorption capacity 
   1.a) Real needs according to the set objectives and international commitments made 
   1.b) Availability of production factors for identifying, organising and implementing  
projects and programmes 
2.) Financial absorption capacity 
   2.a) Co-financing capacity of the recipients of funds  
   2.b) Capacity of the Member State for public co-financing  
3.) Programme / project absorption capacity 
   3.a) Relevance of the strategy and programme bases (national and EU) according to real  
needs – from point 1. 
   3.b) Adequacy of concrete implementing instruments  
   3.c) Preparation of project documentation  
4.) Administrative absorption capacity 
   4.a) Capacity for preparing and implementing administrative work by or for applicants 
   4.b) Administrative capacity of public administration  
 
Real absorption capacity depends on the real investment needs to reach the objectives 
set, as well as fulfil international commitments made, where particular account is given 
to: (i) needs defined in real terms only in part where their fulfilment promotes 
development, competitiveness and where public intervention is justified; (ii) set 
objectives, i.e. social, business and individual objectives, which have to be feasible; and 
(iii) internationally adopted commitments, where it is possible to measure the extent of 
investment needs with great precision. Further, the availability of production factors for 
identifying, organising and implementing projects and programmes, where apart from 
(physical) capital, which in principle is not a limitation in modern society, it is also 
necessary to include staff, institutional (e.g. regulatory framework and State aid rules) and 
spatial resources.  
Financial absorption capacity can be first divided into co-financing capacity of the 
recipients of funds. Due to the co-financing requirements of the Cohesion policy regulations 
as well as rules on state aid, recipients face not just the problem of providing enough co-
financing as such, but can in some systems also face the liquidity problem due to so-called 
pre-financing of the EU resources by the recipients. The second dimension of financial 
absorption capacity according to Mrak and Wostner (2004), refers to the capacity of the 
Member State for public co-financing, i.e. the national public co-finance of EU funds.  
Programme / project absorption capacity first refers to the relevance of the strategy and 
programme bases (national and EU) according to real needs, where it is important that the 
Member State has a well-defined development strategy, not only on the national level but 
also on the local/regional level. Second, adequacy of concrete implementing instruments 
(calls for projects, etc.) will play a major role in determining whether, despite the right 
purpose and compliance with the programmes, the eventually co-financed operations will 
have the desired impact, duly taking into account criteria for public intervention and the 
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objectives of the programmes. In this regard, the availability and quality of information on 
instruments or public tenders, extent and adequacy of the required documentation, timely 
information and suitable deadlines for applications are also of great importance. Lastly, 
with regard to programme and project absorption capacity, the preparation of project 
documentation should be given due care. Especially for investment projects, it is necessary 
to prepare, before the start of the investment and use of funds, extensive documentation 
and acquire all the necessary permits, which can be a complex and cumbersome process.  
With regard to administrative absorption capacity, it is first necessary to take into 
account the capacity for preparing and implementing administrative work by or for the 
applicants. They need to be able to cope with a number of more-or-less bureaucratic 
processes from applications to reporting, storage of documents, providing various 
supporting documents, etc. Here also, the quality of the consulting services market can be 
very important as the recipient can outsource a major part of these processes to an 
external consultant. Second, in order to actually receive EU funds, the administrative 
capacity of the national administration must be ensured. The Member States need to be 
able to implement complex procedures, i.e. from the moment when the 
project/programme contractors have submitted their invoices to the relevant authority, a 
system of controls and provision of supporting documents and requests for payment must be 
introduced, which eventually lead to payment claims submission to the European 
Commission.  
One of a few systematic analysis to be actually verified and quantified on (then yet to 
become) Member States was prepared by Boeckhout, Boot, Hollanders, Reincke and de Vet 
(2002, 2003), with the methodology applied to the Candidate Countries by Papadopoulos 
(2003). The studies identify, for each step of the policy cycle (management, programming, 
implementation, monitoring & evaluation and financial management & control), critical 
factors in terms of structure, human resources and systems & tools. Structure relates to the 
clear assignment of responsibilities and tasks to institutions (including supervisory and 
ancillary bodies), and more specifically to particular units and departments within those 
institutions, and this must be done for all the steps of Structural Funds implementation. In 
terms of human resources, it is not just important to unsure enough properly trained staff, 
but also to ensure proper detail in specifying the tasks and responsibilities as well as 
organisational and motivation structures. Lastly, systems and tools relate to the availability 
of instruments, methods, guidelines, manuals, systems, procedures, forms etc, which do 
not just improve the quality of implementation in the short run, but make implicit 
knowledge explicit, making institutional structures less vulnerable to shocks, staff mobility, 
etc.  
All dimensions need to be properly taken care of in order for the implementation system to 
function, which is summarised in Table 2. 
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Source: Boeckhout et al, (2002): 29 
More detailed analysis and suggestions were put forward, which will be referred to in later 
sections. However, the authors have also prepared a short list of key messages for designing 
efficient and effective implementation systems (Boeckhout et al (2002): 29): 
i. Establish the appropriate structures quickly and precisely. They need to reflect the 
existing administrative structures and traditions. 
ii. Overall, simple management structures require less administrative capacity than 
complicated structures. However, simple management structures can sometimes 
lead to more complicated implementation structures and extended Monitoring 
Committees. 
iii. Human resources are vital: detail the staff requirements and provide the conditions 
for recruiting, retaining and training qualified staff, preferably for all 
administrative staff but at least for the key staff managing the Structural Funds. 
iv. Develop systems, procedures, manuals, guidelines and other tools in order to 
increase productivity, efficiency, consistency and quality of work, while reducing 
the vulnerability of organisations and their dependence on individuals. 
v. Prepare for a head-start by utilising existing experiences that have been gained in 
the pre-accession stage, wherever applicable and useful. It is crucial that 
organisations develop a capacity to learn from their previous experiences. 
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vi. Divide management attention between all areas of the policy life cycle, notably 
financial management & control and implementation, but also programming and 
monitoring & evaluation. 
Another interesting introduction and overview of the absorption capacity concept and 
literature can be found in Horvat (2003) and (2005). The author notes the absence of a 
conceptual framework to comprehensively assess the issue of absorption problems relating 
to Structural Funds, and so uses more extensively the development economics and public 
choice literatures. Apart from the theoretical considerations, he makes an empirical 
investigation in the administrative absorption capacity of the candidate countries, in 
essence, using the Boeckhout et al (2002) methodology on the basis of newly available 
documents and making further recommendations as to how Structural Funds can be used in 
most efficient manner. 
Horvat (2005) specifies an interesting ‘golden rule’, which is about the virtuosity of 
concentrated implementation systems. It claims that “the smaller the number of 
institutions (usually sectoral Ministries) involved at the levels of Management and 
Programmes (Sectoral and Regional) presented at the level of Programming in the 
Candidate Countries, the clearer the picture and higher the possibility of better 
administrative absorption of Structural Funds” (ibid., 13). From the more public choice 
arena, he makes observations as to the relationship between political sphere and 
absorption, especially from the perspective of staff requirements and institutional 
structures. The author calls for timely reorganisation and the need to ensure continuity of 
personnel whatever the organisational changes. He also draws attention to the necessity of 
having close political relationship between the Managing Authority and the Prime Minister.  
At a more detailed level, there is a large range of studies prepared by the European Policies 
Research Centre (EPRC hereafter), which can be found at 
www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/publications.cfm. They have been preparing detailed and 
regular studies for over 20 years; apart from good analytical work, their particular merit is 
in the empirical approach, i.e. their method has usually been based on the detailed surveys 
of the particular situations in the regions and Member States.  
As far as implementation systems are concerned the report by Taylor et al (2000), 
introduces a general typology, which is primarily based on so-called ‘administrative 
additionality’, i.e. the extent to which the Structural Funds implementation system is 
designed alongside national programmes. In such a way the following approaches are 
identified: 
• differentiated systems, whereby Cohesion policy operates outside the usual 
national policy context (typical countries are B, DK, NL, S, UK); 
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• subsumed5 systems, where both Structural Funds and national policies are merged 
(typical countries are D, A, ES); 
• composite6 systems, where separate system is designed on top of the national 
system (typical countries are F, FIN, IT). 
The authors deem the differentiated systems to be relatively less efficient in that they 
involve the creation of additional structures and procedures, but this also means that they 
are more easily made transparent. In the subsumed systems, it is easier to make use of 
sectoral expert knowledge and existing project pipelines, while the coordinating institution 
keeps its focus on the strategic issues (programming, monitoring and evaluation). At the 
same time, this can represent a problem, since it is harder to ensure consistency across 
different parts of the operational programmes and can also be more demanding and 
confusing for potential applicants. The report makes a more in-depth analysis of different 
solutions to which we will make further reference in the relevant section. However, the 
authors also point out, that in spite of several common features regardless of institutional 
context, it is difficult to make generalisations as to which approach would be universally 
better. 
An overview of the particular solutions used in the regions and Member States as regards 
the implementation systems is provided in Ferry (2005) and Ferry et al (2007). They argue 
that over the past 15-20 years the implementation systems have become more 
sophisticated, less centralized and more integrated, with the most noticeable evolution 
taking place in the project appraisal and selection systems, which have become more pro-
active and strategic. Recent trends in implementation systems during the transition to the 
2007-2013 operational programmes, however, has been compiled by Bachtler et al (2006), 
which go in three directions. 
a) The majority of regions/Member States are largely retaining the previous 
implementation structures in terms of their centralised or regionalised approach. 
Thus, one continues to see a centralised approach in EE, LT, LV, MT, CY, L, with 
the Baltic states and Slovenia making an effort to give sub-national implementing 
bodies more involvement but not to the extent of regionalising management; a 
regionalised approach in A, B and non-convergence Italy, while FIN, F, D, IE, 
Convergence Italy, ES use a mixed central-regional approach. 
b) There are tendencies, however, of strengthened regionalisation of some aspects of 
implementation. Especially in countries with increased available resources, i.e. the 
EU12, there are tendencies to move some of the implementation responsibilities 
from central to regional level. This is especially the case in CZ, HU, PL, SK which 
are introducing regional operational programmes. At the same time, however, due 
                                                 
5 These systems are referred to as integrated systems by Ferry et al (2007). 
6 These systems are referred to as aligned systems by Ferry et al (2007). 
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to concerns about administrative capacity and expertise at sub-national level, 
central implementation structures are still expected to continue to play a dominant 
role. There are also some regionalisation tendencies in other countries based on the 
motive that in this way more targeted and regionally adapted interventions could 
be devised. 
c) All programmes are looking at ways to rationalise their implementation structures. 
Rationalisation is an overall phenomenon both in countries with falling as well as 
increasing financial envelopes. In the former, this can be attributed to efficiency 
reasons, because it is not feasible to sustain the same institutional structures with 
smaller programmes, which are consequently more focused on particular issues. 
The latter Member States are forced into rationalisation because of the restrictions 
in hiring additional public employees, which prevents them increasing 
proportionally the staff dealing with Cohesion policy implementation. Thus, we can 
expect rationalisation at all levels: central, regional as well as effort to improve 
cooperation and relationships between the two levels.  
In terms of what is being financed, i.e. programming, as well financial progress, EPRC has 
been preparing regular reports based on its secretariat role in the IQ-Net project (e.g. 
Bachtler et al (2000), Bachtler and Michie (2001), Polverari et al (2005), Bachtler et al 
(2006) and Gross and Davies (2007). More relevant for our analysis, however, is the question 
to what extent programming, as a basic characteristic of Cohesion policy implementation 
systems, in fact brings value added. This issue has been addressed in Bachtler and Taylor 
(2003), where they argue that programming strengthens the consistency of the operations 
financed, encourages strategic thinking and planning, promotes an inclusive approach and 
especially improves the clarity of objectives and targets. Furthermore, programming is 
supposed to contribute significantly to more evidence-based policy development, with the 
particular benefit of having a multi-sectoral approach often combined with geographical 
focus, which due to its multi-annual approach, provides stable policy environment. They 
also point out some negative properties of programming. First, programming prolongs the 
implementation cycle, which tends to be under tight pressure anyway due to late 
regulatory framework approvals; second, that decisions nevertheless remain determined by 
the overtly political compromise. Furthermore, the programming context is also criticised 
that it does not provide enough flexibility since adjustment of programmes takes many 
months. 
One of the first systematic insights into project generation, appraisal and selection phases 
has been put forward by Fitzgerald and Promé (1996). A more in-depth analysis of the 
processes and their consequences however can be found in Taylor et al (2000) and Ferry et 
al (2007). The core objective in project selection is to ensure a system that will be 
efficient, effective and transparent, since it is the supported projects that will eventually 
feed through into the foreseen impacts in the operational programmes. According to Ferry 
et al (2007), project generation, appraisal and selection has been one of the crucial 
developments in the implementation systems in the last 15 years, with approaches 
gradually evolving from a ‘list of projects’ approach to a more sophisticated and co-
ordinated method of allocating resources to projects (ibid., 9). Their work will be used 
extensively as a reference in our analysis. 
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Finally, as far as monitoring and evaluation are concerned, the EPRC has produced a 
number of studies that give detailed overview on different approaches taken by the 
Member States and regions, which are also cited later in the text, e.g. Bachtler and Taylor 
(1999), Taylor, Bachtler and Polverari (2001), Raines and Taylor (2002), Taylor et al (2004) 
and Polverari et al (2007). The most complete overview can be found in the latter, where it 
is argued that the long-term trend in the complexity as well as applicability of the 
monitoring and evaluation systems is encouraging. The first financial perspective after the 
1988 reform saw a very modest introduction of the monitoring and evaluation systems, 
which provided evaluations “of a low quality” and “lacking methodological rigour” (ibid., 
5), also due to “widespread lack of monitoring data”, which was “particularly acute at the 
regional level” (ibid., 5). 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this paper, as already presented in the introductory section, is to 
systematically identify those institutional arrangements at every step of the policy cycle, 
which contribute to an efficient and effective Cohesion policy implementation system. In 
this regard it has to be recognised that it is usually hard to isolate the contribution of a 
particular implementation phase or arrangement to the overall efficiency of the system. 
Furthermore, one has to bear in mind, that, due to very diverse institutional contexts and 
implementation arrangements, it is extremely hard to make generalised observations. 
Nevertheless, there is only one underlying set of rules, which underpins the implementation 
of Cohesion policy, which can be improved only on the basis of generic conclusions. 
Additionally, for countries with similar implementation arrangements common 
recommendations can be put forward. 
The ÖIR (2003) study has provided extensive insight into what is important and what 
different solutions Member States and regions came up with. The focus in our analysis 
however will be on the perception of people directly involved in Cohesion policy 
implementation, on how systems and processes should be organised in order to make them 
more efficient and effective as they presently are. Special attention is given to countries 
that became full EU members in 2004. This is for two reasons: first, because they, apart 
from the pre-accession period, have not received much systematic analysis and second, 
because they possess a markedly different historical, administrative and political 
background, which gives additional insight into possible institutional setups most 
conductive to efficiency. Furthermore, as new entrants into the system, these countries 
comparatively exhibit more flexibility and modifications of systems and thus represent a 
good study group for analysing the micro-efficiency of different systems. 
The systematic analysis of the paper makes use of existing evaluations and complements 
them with the conclusions from an extended EU-wide questionnaire (see Annex 1), which 
was prepared specifically as a basis for this paper. The questionnaire is structured around 
the standard phases of the policy cycle (e.g. Fitzgerald and Promé (1996)): (a) 
programming; (b) project generation, appraisal and selection; (c) implementation 
(implementing structure, financial management and controls); and (d) monitoring and 
evaluation. For each phase, a critical assessment has been made of present practices, 
which often required the preparation of relevant typologies due to different practices in 
different systems. On this basis, it has been possible to survey respondents’ views on how 
implementation systems could be made more efficient and effective. Since the focus of the 
paper is on the optimal design (according to Boeckhout et al (2002) of the implementation 
systems, the framework conditions (or context according to ÖIR (2003) were also addressed. 
This means that the analysis predominantly looks at the supply side of absorption capacity, 
i.e. it is primarily interested in the ‘programme/project absorption capacity’ and 
‘administrative absorption capacity’ according to Mrak and Wostner (2004). That being said 
however, we have also addressed those demand-side factors that should influence decision-
making on Cohesion policy implementing provisions (e.g. in project generation or allocation 
of money to project phases). Structuring of the questionnaire and research has also 
benefited from the author’s first-hand experience of Cohesion policy management, as he 
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was directly responsible for the Structural and Cohesion Funds implementation in the 
Slovenian Managing Authority. 
The questionnaire was sent to 449 addresses. Use was made of the existing networks of 
managing authorities, the Council working group responsible for Cohesion policy (Structural 
Actions Working Party), while, on the side of the European Commission, the questionnaire 
was sent to all directors in DG Regional Policy and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities, including to the evaluation networks. Additionally, the questionnaire was 
sent to experts involved in Cohesion policy evaluation, for which membership of the 
European Regional Science Association was used, as was the Interact network. Finally, for 
every questionnaire sent, a request was also submitted to resend the questionnaire onwards 
to relevant personnel at Commission, national and particularly regional level. The basic 
requirement was that the person answering should have direct experience in Cohesion 
policy management. It was not unusual that the respondents provided answers only in those 
areas where they felt they had enough experience. Consequently the data set in not 
entirely balanced. 
The characteristics of the questionnaire respondents can be found in Table 3. 
Table 3: Characteristics of the questionnaire respondents 
Institution 
Country 





No. 1 1 3 2 4 11 
% 9.1 9.1 27.3 18.2 36.4 100.0 EU15 
% 25.0 9.1 21.4 40.0 36.4 24.4 
No. 3 10 11 3 7 34 
% 8.8 29.4 32.4 8.8 20.6 100.0 EU12 
% 75.0 90.9 78.6 60.0 63.6 75.6 
No. 4 11 14 5 11 45 
% 8.9 24.4 31.1 11.1 24.4 100.0 Total 
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: EC: European Commission; MA: Managing Authority; IB: Intermediate Body; Impl Reg Level: 
regional level implementation; EU15: Members of the EU before 2004; EU12: Member States that 
acceded in 2004 or after. 
We have received 45 answers, which puts the response rate at exactly 10%, which is not 
high but still acceptable given the limited number of experienced people in the field and 
secondly, given the structure of the respondents. Here, one can see that just over 75% of 
respondents come from the EU12. This is above their respective share in the available 
funding for 2007-2013 period, which is 52%, but, as mentioned earlier, we wanted to give 
these countries more attention. In terms of institutional representation the structure of the 
sample is also representative. From the European Commission we have received four 
replies, which put their response rate at a disappointing 6.6%, disappointing especially 
given its declared focus on the necessity of evaluation in Cohesion policy. Further, 55% of 
the respondents come directly from institutions responsible for implementation in the 
Member States: these are managing authorities (24%) and intermediate bodies (31%). The 
European Policy Research Paper, No 64 16 European Policies Research Centre 
The Micro-efficiency of EU Cohesion Policy  
former are responsible for all the organisational, management and control systems as well 
strategic steering of the programmes, while intermediate bodies are institutions to which 
managing authorities can delegate certain tasks (exact delegation depends on the specific 
country/regional arrangement). An additional 11% of replies came from the regional or 
better sub-national implementation level, which can include both de-concentrated national 
offices as well as proper regional representations. Lastly, 24% of respondents came from 
outside the Cohesion policy implementation system, and are familiar with the Cohesion 
policy implementation systems usually due to their involvement either as consultants or 
evaluators. 
In order to take account of the institutional contexts of the Member States, we have also 
classified the Member States in three groups, depending on the extent to which their 
implementation systems are implemented on the national/regional level and to what 
extent they are implemented in a concentrated/de-concentrated manner (the former refers 
to a situation where there are small, and, in the latter, larger, numbers of institutions 
involved in the implementation system on a particular level). This typology however needs 
to be treated with caution, because there is bias in the sample towards national 
concentrated institutional arrangements (representing 69% of the answers) due to the bias 
of such arrangements in the EU12 Member States (CY, SI, EE, LT, LU); 17% of respondents 
come from countries with a regionalised but concentrated approach (PL, BU, ES); and 14% 
come from countries with a regionalised/de-concentrated approach (A, CZ, D, UK). It 
should also be recognised that the classification of Member States and regions is somewhat 
arbitrary so this typology will be used more for illustrative purposes. 
The average age of the respondents was 39 years, with an above-average representation of 
men (62%). This is probably due to the over-representation of men in strategic management 
positions, from which 60% of respondents came. Finally, the respondents from the sample 
are extremely highly qualified as 53% have postgraduate education or above and only 2% 
high school or lower level of education. Of course this is not surprising given the demanding 
requirements of Cohesion policy implementation. 
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4. FACTORS DETERMINING MICRO-EFFICIENCY 
4.1 Framework conditions 
4.1.1 EU versus national regulation 
The Cohesion policy implementation system must be designed and consistent with the 
requirements set out in the Council’s and Commission’s regulations. In the 2007-2013 
period, they refer in particular to:  
• Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund 
and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 
• Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
July 2006 on the European Regional Development Fund and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1783/1999 
• Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
July 2006 on the European Social Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 establishing a Cohesion Fund 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1164/94, and 
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006 of 8 December 2006 setting out rules for 
the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund 
and the Cohesion Fund and of Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Regional Development Fund. 
These regulations give significant scope and flexibility to the Member States and the regions 
as to how they adapt these provisions to their particular circumstances. The regulations 
leave considerable room for interpretation, which in such a diverse grouping as the EU is 
unavoidable and could be considered a strength of the system. The flexibility provided 
allows more diversity and scope for innovative solutions and adaptations, which can 
improve the overall efficiency of the system. However, the Council, while discussing the 
Regulations, can never know ex-ante what kind of attitude the European Commission will 
take (ex-post) in interpreting the rules. Namely, the interpretations tend not to work in the 
direction of increased flexibility, but instead tend to be used in a restrictive manner, even 
though the Council, together with the European Parliament as legislative bodies, might not 
have had such an interpretation in mind. As a matter of fact, due to the strengthened 
decentralization of Cohesion policy, the so called ‘soft law’ at the EU level is gaining in 
importance. Soft law is predominantly being prepared by the European Commission 
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services, often in the framework of the relevant Committees (COCOF7 and ESF), which 
continuously produce interpretations, guidelines and opinions, and these can significantly 
influence the way Cohesion policy is being implemented. One solution to the problem of 
different ex-post interpretation of legislation, as foreseen by the legislator, is to be more 
prescriptive in the regulation, but which has a cost not just with regard to reduced 
flexibility, but also in increased complexity and bureaucratisation of the legal framework. 
Thus, in future, it could make more sense that, at the request of the Council working group 
negotiating the regulations, the Commission’s interpretation of a particular article or issue 
in the regulation during negotiations would be noted for subsequent use. In this way, the 
legislative bodies, together with the Commission, could better describe the ‘spirit and 
intentions’ behind the legal provisions in the regulation. As will be seen later, however, this 
topic is closely related to the multi-level governance issue, which will be addressed in later 
sections. 
This being said, it would be misleading to point the finger only at the Commission as the 
main responsible institution for the observation that “the regulatory environment is not 
conducive to an efficient implementation of the funds”, a statement with which 60% of the 
ÖIR study respondents agreed (ÖIR, 2003, 64). A lot of complexity and bureaucratisation, 
namely, is caused by the national and also regional institutional arrangements. Again citing 
the ÖIR study, “the Commission can simplify some of its procedures” but “it is up to the 
Member States to streamline the procedures imposed on project promoters” (ÖIR, 2003, 
25). The importance of streamlining the procedures cannot be overestimated since the 
number of beneficiaries all over the EU are actually coming to an almost perverse 
conclusion that their cost in order to get the EU subsidy is simply too high to be worth the 
effort. We will come back to this issue, but, in our analysis, we wanted to make a specific 
investigation into “to what extent are, according to respondents’ opinions, the 
administrative procedures for the absorption of funds related to EU / national legislation”?  
The replies confirm the joint responsibility of both EU and national legislations and rules for 
the complexity of administrative procedures. On average, 55% of the administrative 
procedures are estimated to be due to EU legislation, and though the share seems to be 
lower in the EU15 which ascribes 48% to the EU level, whereas in the EU12 the 
corresponding share is actually 58%. This could suggest that, with time, the Member States 
and regions learn how to make better use of the EU rules’ flexibility and play it to their 
advantage, whereas this is more difficult for the legislation of “national origin”. What is 
also interesting is that there is no major difference of perception among different 
institutional affiliations. This can be interpreted in two ways: first, that there is significant 
responsibility and, given the critical perception of beneficiaries, also scope for 
improvement on the level of EU regulations, but that at the same time almost a 
corresponding share of responsibility lies on the Member States level. Interestingly 
though, the least critical score to Member States’ bureaucratisation was given by the 
                                                 
7 Coordination Committee of the Funds, as described in article 103 of the Regulation 1083/2006. 
European Policy Research Paper, No 64 20 European Policies Research Centre 
The Micro-efficiency of EU Cohesion Policy  
countries with a regionalised/de-concentrated approach, having attributed only 28% of all 
administrative procedures to the national/regional level. 
4.1.2 Financial critical mass 
The second issue that needs to be addressed as part the framework conditions analysis is 
the size of the programmes. Significant attention has been given to the maximum feasible 
and manageable extent of transfers to particular Member State relative to the GDP. This 
was explicitly regulated in the 2000-2006 regulation at the level of 4% of GDP and even 
lower in the financial negotiations for the 2007-2013 period. At the same time, however, 
not much attention has been given to the principle of concentration. Even though 
concentration is one of the Cohesion policy general principles, there was not much debate 
on the issue. Given the significant administrative and institutional requirements and costs 
(e.g. programming requirements, control and audit systems, etc.), it is not self-evident 
that Cohesion policy is justified whatever the level of support. Because people involved in 
Cohesion policy implementation are usually or rather, not necessarily, well-informed on the 
average yearly aid intensities for their own and other regions, we have asked the question 
indirectly, i.e. whether “there exists a critical minimum level of resources per 
operational programme below which the present Cohesion policy approach is no longer 
justified”? It turns out that almost two thirds (62.5%) of the respondents seem to believe 
this is the case, in other words, that there should be a limited lowest level of resources 
per operational programme.  
The distribution of answers as to what this minimum level of resources per operational 
programme should be, is however, rather dispersed. On average, 41% of respondents 
believe that this figure should be below €20 million per year (for the seven-year financial 
perspective this would refer to an operational programme of €140 million), of which two-
thirds actually feel that the minimum limit should be half that size. On the other hand, the 
remaining 60% believe the operational programme should be financially more significant to 
justify all the institutions and costs associated with them: at least over €140 million for the 
seven year period, with 14% of respondents claiming that the minimum threshold should be 
at least around half a billion euros. Thus, there seems to be significant support for the 
notion that the operational programmes should be financially rather significant: the 
median respondent estimated the minimum level of resources per OP between €140 
and €280 million for a seven-year period. According to the present system, the allocation 
of resources per operational programme is determined by the Member States, so this 
proposition to a significant degree affects the Member States. Nevertheless, there might be 
cases in Objective 2, and especially Objective 3 areas, where this minimum threshold could 
also be regulated at the EU level. 
4.2 Implementation structure 
Cohesion policy implementation systems are dependent on the broader institutional setup 
of countries and regions in question. The literature presented in the second section has 
introduced by now already standardised typology of approaches. 
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Firstly, administrative systems can be differentiated according to whether they are 
centralised or decentralised. We have already introduced such classification in the section 
on methodology, but will expand on this here. The centralised systems tend to put much 
more weight on decision-making and implementation by the established national 
institutions, usually ministries, but also other public bodies. On the other hand, 
decentralised systems, which predominantly refer to federal countries and systems 
involving autonomous regions, put greater emphasis on the so-called multilevel governance, 
with decisions and management taken at different levels, thus giving more attention to 
decentralisation and partnership. However, there is also a combination, whereby 
implementation is primarily based on national institutions but in their regional exposures. 
This is usually classified as a de-concentrated model. In our analysis we are not 
differentiating between self-governing and de-concentrated regional approaches, because a 
number of other factors influence the efficiency of either of the systems, which thus goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. We do recognise that both approaches bring 
‘implementation closer to the citizen’, and this is something that we are interested in. 
A second differentiation put forward in the literature (e.g. Taylor et al (2000), Ferry et al 
(2007)) refers to the degree to which management functions are carried out in the 
framework of a pre-existing administrative/institutional setup, i.e. the extent of 
administrative additionality. Systems where Structural Funds rules are interlinked with the 
general public administrative system are referred to as integrated or subsumed systems, 
while systems with separate implementation systems specific to Cohesion policy and thus 
outside of the general administrative framework are referred to as differentiated systems.  
The integrated systems try to make best use of the available (sectoral) expert knowledge 
and know-how in the administration. This also makes them cost effective. These systems 
can make good use of existing project pipelines, as appraisal and decision-making are 
usually done through established resource allocation mechanisms. Thus, no special 
procedures are (in principle) necessary. Some adaptations are admittedly always necessary 
so as to comply with the minimum standards of Cohesion policy (e.g. publicity 
requirements). Furthermore, making use of existing economic development administrative 
channels makes it easier for the potential beneficiaries to have an overview of what is 
going on in a particular policy field. At the same time, however, an integrated approach 
makes the system less transparent in terms of public awareness of the purposes that the 
available EU resources can be used for, and makes it harder for the managing authority to 
ensure coordination and standardised procedures and forms. This can turn out to be 
somewhat confusing for potential applicants (e.g. who is responsible for what in Cohesion 
policy, different approaches and interpretations, etc). Ferry et al (2007) further 
differentiate between two types of integrated systems depending on whether EU or 
national resources are dominant. In the former case, the whole national development 
policy adjusts to the Cohesion policy approach to development policy implementation, 
which is generally perceived as positive. A major drawback of dominant EU resources might 
be, however, that development policy could give too much attention to eligible activities 
only, and that the absorption of EU funds might bias the whole development policy towards 
those activities were money can be spent more easily.  
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Under the differentiated systems, separate institutional structures and channels are put in 
place, which means that one single system operates across a whole programme. This makes 
it easier to steer the programme implementation towards set objectives. Differentiated 
systems also make it easier to ensure consistency in implementation with regard to 
technical requirements for the applicants whatever the policy area, because there are no 
pre-established practices in the responsible institutions. Separate systems, however, by 
definition mean higher costs and potential duplication problems. A particular problem in 
such an approach is coordination with other national development initiatives. Coming back 
to Taylor et al (2000), there seems to be a trade-off between, on the one hand, the 
administrative simplicity offered by using existing domestic systems, and on the other 
hand, the strategic coherence and visibility of EU funding offered by separate systems. 
Taylor et al (2000), have nicely worked out the advantages and disadvantages of both 
implementation systems in terms of their contribution to efficiency, effectiveness and 
transparency, which is broadly summarised in Table 4. 
Table 4: Advantages and disadvantages of differentiated and subsumed systems 
 Efficiency Effectiveness Transparency 
A single system 
operates across a 
whole programmes. 
Can promote strategic 
coherence across a 
programme and enables 
an overview to be easily 
maintained. 
Greater visibility of 
Funds and easier 
overview of how 
decisions are made. 
Differentiated systems 
BUT has to be 
established and 
operated. Requires a 
marketing effort. 




BUT possible conflicts 





making by sectoral 
experts. 
Systems can be simple 
for applicants. 
Subsumed systems BUT challenging for 
the Structural Fund 
programmes co-
ordinator to maintain 
an overview. 
BUT fragmentation 
leading to a potential 
lack of overall 
coherence.  
Hard for Structural 
Fund co-ordinator to 
influence decision 
systems. 
BUT overall Fund 
visibility can be low. 
Overview of decision 
and criteria is difficult 
to compile. 
Source: Taylor et al (2000): 2 
Apart from integrated and differentiated systems, Ferry et al (2007) also refer to aligned 
systems8 in which, there are “separate decision-making systems for the EU and national 
funding...., but they operate in parallel or in some other coordinated manner” (ibid., vii), 
so they represent a mix of the two systems presented above. Such an approach promotes 
coordinated policy-making with the national resources, increases the scope for exchange of 
                                                 
8 Taylor et al (2000), refer to them as “composite systems”. 
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experience and offers better value for money, but at the same time poses a “danger of 
administrative overload and problems with transparency and complexity”. 
The decision on the approach to the implementing structure is immensely important since 
such decisions tend not to change over time. According to Taylor et al (2000), the following 
factors determine the approach taken by the Member States (p13): 
a) The conception of the role of SF in domestic economic development activity, 
which can be understood ‘just’ as a financial compensation mechanism or, at the 
other extreme, Cohesion policy can be taken as an incentive for change not just in 
terms of policy-making but also institutionally. 
b) The influence of legal frameworks governing public sector activities, where it 
depends to what extent the legal framework allows the introduction or change of 
responsibilities.  
c) The influence of administrative traditions, where decision-making can be 
traditionally very concentrated in responsible institutions rather than making 
decisions in the framework of partnership based committees.  
d) The demand for SF support can require more complex and transparent decision-
making structures. 
e) Judgements weighting the cost of dedicated structures against the significance of 
the Funds, thus looking at whether greater costs of the differentiated systems 
outweigh the benefits. 
There is general agreement that every management structure needs clearly defined roles 
and coordination processes well explained, documented and implemented, for the system 
to work well. It is furthermore important to realise that the implementation system is 
capable of operating well within either of the systems described above (see example to 
ÖIR (2003), Taylor et al (2000), Boeckhout et al (2002). Apart from the above 
considerations, we will put forward crucial factors as well as guiding principles, which 
should be taken into account when deciding on structure of the implementation system. 
Cohesion policy implementation systems are administratively demanding in all 
circumstances. This necessitates making the best use of the available resources. With 
regard to centralised or decentralised approaches this means, at least in the initial stages, 
that systems should be adapted to the existing institutional set-up of the country 
(Boeckhout et al, 2002), i.e. towards the level where the greatest institutional capacity 
lies. Only in the latter stages could they also be used as a means to reform the institutional 
structures (e.g. strengthened decentralisation). With regard to integrated vs. differentiated 
systems, the decision should, to an important degree, depend on the quality and efficiency 
of the existing administrative system. If the existing public administration system is 
streamlined and efficient, it makes a lot of sense to integrate Cohesion policy into the same 
framework. This would not just make the implementation easier for applicants, but would 
also make best use of the existing human capital in the administration. Staffing problems 
tend to represent one of the most serious challenges in the initial stages of Cohesion policy 
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implementation. The decision to adopt the differentiated systems could, however, well be 
justified if the existing administration system tends to be overly bureaucratic and complex, 
since it is not very likely that the introduction of Cohesion policy would provide enough 
incentive to reform the system as a whole. It might only be reasonable to expect this when 
there is a direct commitment at the highest political level. Furthermore, a differentiated 
approach might also be relatively more justified where the available financial resources for 
the Member State in question are rather modest, also indicating that the scope of 
interventions is rather limited. In such a setting a differentiated system can be 
advantageous, because the specialised institution can adapt all the procedures to best suit 
the purpose and requirements of Cohesion policy. As a consequence, however, such systems 
tend to have more difficulties with project generation (See Section 4.4.1). Finally, in every 
possible combination or context, we would put forward three horizontal guiding principles 
that should be addressed when specifying implementation systems. These are (a) the 
necessity for coordination; (b) number of institutions involved in the implementation 
system; and (c) the extent to which it is possible/sensible to outsource the implementation 
of Cohesion policy.  
4.2.1 Necessity for coordination 
Coordination tends to be associated with the managing authority function, although as we 
will see later, not necessarily so. Previous studies have already come to the conclusion that 
the MA’s role and importance is strong, that generally there is a predominantly positive 
attitude towards their performance, and that there is 86% support for the notion that 
managing authorities in their respective regions are “organised and structured in an 
appropriate manner” (ÖIR, 2003: 68). Furthermore, according to Boeckhout et al (2002: 8), 
it is “vital to locate the MAs of operational programmes in line with the position in the 
national hierarchy and the existing administrative structures”. 
To understand the importance of coordination, we must first specify the functions of the 
managing authorities who, in essence, represent the highest institution in the national 
hierarchy. With some generalisation, their role could be summarised as: 
a) strategic steering of the operational programmes, including the 
programming/partnership phases (determining what is being financed); and 
b) ensuring legal compliance of the implementation system according to the 
regulatory framework, and especially compliance with the sound financial 
management principle. 
The first function encompasses programming, decision-making on what is being financed as 
well as provision of the necessary tools for proper decision-making - i.e. the functions of 
monitoring and evaluation. As far as the second function is concerned, it primarily refers to 
the setting up of managing and control systems, and subsequently making sure that the 
actual implementation abides by those rules. These are standard and also common 
functions, which managing authorities all over the EU must perform. The difference, 
however, lies in the extent to which these functions are delegated to the so-called 
“intermediate bodies”. Namely Article 59 of the general regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 
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No 1083/2006; general regulation hereafter) stipulates that “The Member State may 
designate one or more intermediate bodies to carry out some or all of the tasks of the 
managing or certifying authority under the responsibility of that authority”.  
The decision on what to delegate primarily lies in the distribution of responsibilities and 
know-how in the national/regional institutional system and, as put forward by Boeckhout et 
al (2002: 9), “no uniform concept regarding the delegation of tasks by MAs has emerged. To 
the contrary, every country has elaborated the role of MAs in a different way, reflecting 
the administrative structures, the planning traditions, the balance of power and the size of 
the country”. Based on our analysis, the decision on how to structure the implementation 
system should, giving due account to the national institutional system, be founded on two 
criteria: 
• To what extent are policy fields that are to be co-financed dependent on other 
policies? The dependence primarily refers to possible/necessary synergies and 
complementarities and this can either be with other EU co-financed programmes or 
with other national policies?  
• To what extent is it justified to impose standardised procedures and forms of 
Cohesion policy on a particular policy area? 
Clearly, in the national/regional context the responsibility for a particular function needs 
to be given to the institutions best capable of pursuing the task, particularly where the 
benefits of specialisation come to the fore. However, this notion is restricted by the value 
added of pursuing policies in support of each others’ goals (increased efficiency) and the 
value added of increased transparency for the applicants, if they are required to comply 
with the same set of rules whatever the particular operation in question. Thus, the more 
self-standing the policy, the more sense it makes to have all the functions concentrated 
in the responsible institution (based on national institutional setup). On the other hand, 
the more the policy in question is intertwined with other policies, and the higher the 
likelihood that other EU and/or national policies are targeted at the same potential 
beneficiaries, the more sense it makes to have strong coordinating institution which 
works closely with the specialised implementing institutions – i.e. intermediate bodies.  
Delegation of tasks to intermediate bodies can be organised in different ways, with the 
crucial distinction being how the negotiating power for policy setting is spread between MA 
and IBs. We would argue that without the residual rights vested in the managing 
authority (i.e. the MA having the final approval and decision-making power), the 
delegation of tasks is inefficient, as it allows game-playing by the intermediate bodies, 
while forcing the MA into over-regulation, because it is otherwise not able to enforce its 
position. This generalised suggestion refers to both the national and regional levels, as well 
as to both differentiated and subsumed systems. 
However, it is not necessarily the managing authority which ensures coordination, even 
though this is usually the case. As shown by the Portuguese or Czech cases, for example, a 
separate institution can also be foreseen, with power and responsibility to coordinate 
and/or supervise the managing authorities. The risk with such an approach is that it could 
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be interpreted as being, to some extent, inconsistent with the spirit of Cohesion policy 
regulations which, apart from the monitoring committee, put the managing authority at the 
top of the hierarchy. This means that final responsibility always rests with the managing 
authority. The actual ability to coordinate the managing authorities of this separate 
institution is therefore dependant on its political power; this, however, makes it 
systematically unstable. 
In the questionnaire responses, we found partial support for the above ideas. We asked, not 
just whether a coordinating institution is needed, but also how much decision-making 
power it should have. There is universal agreement that Cohesion policy needs a 
coordinating institution. This seems to suggest that organising implementation systems, or 
rather operational programmes, “per responsible ministry or institution” is, at least in the 
initial stages, not an efficient solution. However, there is only limited support for the 
notion that the final decision-making right should be vested in the coordinating 
institution. The average score to question 19 namely was 6.4, suggesting that, on average, 
the respondents consider that the coordinating institution should have more than just an 
advice, procedures setting and best practice exchange function, although not as much as to 
give it the veto right. Interestingly, the greatest support for a strong coordinating 
institution unexpectedly came from the managing authorities and, even more surprisingly, 
also from experts outside the system (both scoring 7.3). The intermediate body 
respondents, whose decision-making power would be restricted, expectedly did not support 
the notion of a strong coordinating institution (average score 5.4). The most important 
finding on a more disaggregated level, however, is that the score was significantly lower in 
the EU15 (5.3) than in the EU12 Member States where the average score was 6.9. This 
seems to suggest that newly introduced systems need a stronger coordinating institution 
with significant decision-making powers. With time, however, when the system and 
relationships among institutions become standardised and well established, there is 
greater scope for de-concentration.  
4.2.2 How many institutions should be involved? 
After deciding on the role of the coordinating institution, Member States and regions are 
faced with the next important dilemma, which is about how many institutions (i.e. 
intermediate bodies), should be involved in the implementation system. In order to analyze 
this question, we should first point out that we refer to the predominant type of 
intermediate bodies: institutions which have the authority to propose/define the detailed 
provisions as to what kind of operation and how it should be financed; and those directly 
working with beneficiaries, especially in selecting projects, their monitoring and providing 
support to the project owners. Of course, such intermediate bodies do not necessarily have 
to answer directly to the managing authority, as it is common practice that there can be 
more layers of intermediate bodies, in line with the national/regional institutional system -  
e.g. public implementing institution (second level IB) answering to the ministry (first level 
IB) which is answerable to the managing authority. Clearly, the quality of intermediate 
bodies, given their tasks, is of major importance for the efficiency of the 
implementation system. This notion received 93% support in the ÖIR (2003) study. 
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Empirical investigations indicate that the number of intermediate bodies can differ 
markedly. Boeckhout et al (2002: 17), report that the number of IBs per OP can amount to 
30 or 40, but can even go up to 500. It is hard to assume a priori which approach is more 
efficient, although some authors have argued in favour of concentration (e.g. Horvat, 
2003). It should certainly be recognised however that there are different consequences for 
the implementation system that need to be taken in account. A greater number of involved 
institutions allows better institutional adaptability to the demands of the particular policy 
in question. As a consequence, the involved institutions can reap the benefits of increased 
specialisation, which can be of significant importance. On the other hand, however, it 
should be recognised that Cohesion policy implementation, founded on multi-level 
governance, requires complex and specific know-how. This does not only make the 
implementation of Cohesion policy more expensive than the implementation of domestic 
policies, it also involves noticeable learning costs. During the learning period, there is a 
significantly higher risk of irregularities in the process, resulting in a need to cover the 
additional costs from other (public) sources. Furthermore, a greater number of involved 
institutions magnifies the problem of coordination. This is relevant both in terms of policy-
making (synergies) and, especially, in terms of legality of implementation (standardisation 
of procedures and forms). 
The responses from our questionnaire seem to give a clear indication as to which dimension 
dominates. We have asked whether, for a particular OP, a more concentrated approach 
that involves a smaller number of intermediate bodies and implementing agencies, or a 
more de-concentrated approach with greater number of institutions involved, was 
considered more efficient. The average score for this question was 2.7, which means that 
in more than 7 out of 10 cases respondents would consider a concentrated approach as 
more efficient (consistent with the findings by Horvat (2003)). This is a common position 
for the majority of respondents (small variation in the score), with respondents from EU15 
having a slightly lower tendency to promote a concentrated approach (average score being 
3.1). Interestingly, however, the strongest tendency for a concentrated approach could be 
found among the experts. Classifying answers on the basis of the organisation of the 
implementation systems in respondents’ countries suggests that being in a concentrated 
environment makes the virtues of a more de-concentrated approach more apparent and 
vice versa. Respondents from de-concentrated implementation systems namely consider a 
concentrated approach more efficient in more than 80% of cases. That a smaller number of 
involved institutions is more conducive for an efficient implementation system, was also 
recognised by the EU12 Member States’ representatives during an exchange of experience 
meeting on 1 March 2007 in Ljubljana, where institutional complexity was identified as one 
of the commonly-shared weaknesses. There is a very weak tendency that, over time, 
Member States/regions could “afford” a more de-concentrated approach; the virtues of 
concentrated approach, however, still seem to dominate strongly. 
4.2.3 Outsourcing 
According to the regulations, primary responsibility for the Cohesion policy implementation 
lies with the Member States, that is to say, each Member State’s elected government needs 
to determine who is to carry out the implementation tasks. This means that the 
implementation function originally rests with the public administration. However, some or 
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nearly all of the functions could also be outsourced. In this section we will look at this 
option more closely, making use of a study prepared by Taylor, Rooney and Bachtler (1999), 
who make very useful typology of outsourcing types (ibid., 28): 
• Programme Outsourcing (long-term), which involves contracting a single 
organisation to undertake most of the management and administration functions.  
• Partial Outsourcing (long-term), where either a range of specific programme 
administration tasks are outsourced (e.g. monitoring and steering evaluation) or all 
tasks for specific parts of the programme are outsourced (e.g. management and 
administration of the ESF dimension).  
• Mission Outsourcing (short-term), which involves contracting an external 
organisation to undertake a specific time-limited task (i.e. evaluation study).  
• ‘Insourcing’ brings capacity in terms of manpower and expertise on the basis of 
seconding staff on a temporary basis.  
Our interest primarily lies in the programme and partial outsourcing, since mission 
outsourcing and insourcing are not relevant with regards to how to design the 
implementation structure. Programme and partial outsourcing are not very common, 
though they are not so rare in the implementation of the Community Initiatives. 
Nevertheless, Taylor, Rooney and Bachtler (1999) list a number of benefits that such 
arrangements can bring about (ibid., 60): 
• A new balance between the partners and programming authority that allows for 
more equal cooperation.  
• Local ownership through accessibility, because the outsourced functions can be 
physically located closer to the target area.  
• Partner 'ownership' encouraged through management style or status due to more 
independent status with more responsive management style.  
• New organisations have more flexibility to innovate, (re)invigorating programming.  
• More transparent programme management, since free-standing secretariats are 
typically more explicit and transparent about their objectives and activities. 
• Solution to institutional rivalry: where there are several organisations which could 
take on a programme management role, outsourcing it to a new organisation 
provides a solution to potential institutional rivalry.  
• Higher profile to the programme: Establishing a dedicated organisation to take on 
programme management and administration can help to create a higher profile for 
the programme itself.  
• Civil service streamlining. At the same time as outsourcing programme management 
has benefited programmes themselves, and been welcomed by partnerships, it has 
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enabled government units to pursue their own agenda of streamlining and cost 
cutting.  
• Costs may not be reduced, but they can be offset. There is little or no evidence 
that outsourcing arrangements for programme management and administration cost 
less than undertaking these functions within government units at whatever level. 
However, such arrangements have allowed costs to be offset by transferring them 
to the budgets of other organisations.  
We have emphasised the word “can” because outsourcing is beneficial only under certain 
conditions. It is very hard to generalise on this issue, as solutions again need to be 
specifically adapted to the particular challenge or situation, taking account of the 
institutional setting9. We could nevertheless say that for outsourcing to work: (1) the 
rationale for exactly what (and why) would be outsourced must be clearly understood; (2) 
the institution taking over must have sufficient experience, know-how and organisational 
capacity and style;10 and (3) the institution taking over must be held accountable. All are to 
a large extent related to the ability for good contracting. The first, in the sense that the 
subject of outsourcing (and consequently the contract) needs to be spelled out clearly, 
which also makes the monitoring of its implementation easier. Contractual monitoring has 
its limits; additional measures could, therefore, be foreseen for ensuring accountability. 
Taylor et al (1999: 57) for example stress that “a core guarantee of accountability is that 
the responsibility for outsourced functions can be taken away from the organisations 
undertaking them, if their performance is unsatisfactory”, that the quality of outsourcing 
must be regularly supervised by the programming authority and that, in some cases, the 
work of organisations undertaking outsourced functions have often been subject to 
evaluations. 
In our study, we wanted to get our respondents’ opinions, not just on to what extent they 
consider outsourcing useful, but we also wanted to test the proposition put forward by 
Taylor et al (1999), that there is no noticeable difference in the outsourcing quality 
dependent on the type of organisation taking over. It is reported that the more substantial 
types of outsourcing are predominantly given to semi-public/semi-private organisations, 
while with other types of outsourcing private consultancy firms also get involved. The 
answers seem to reveal a rather indifferent attitude towards outsourcing in general, 
which is probably associated with the fact that it was not possible to differentiate the 
effectiveness of outsourcing under different circumstances or for different functions. Two 
interesting results appear nonetheless. First, there seems to be greater scepticism towards 
                                                 
9 The report does make a general statement however that “the overall level of satisfaction with the 
outsourcing arrangements examined appeared to be high” (Taylor, Rooney and Bachtler, 1999: 62).  
10 This is primarily dependent on the extent to which the market for these services is developed, an 
issue that will be dealt with in greater detail in the section on project appraisal, selection and 
approval. At this point it is worth mentioning however, that the ÖIR (2003) study found that there 
was no shortage of expertise in the market, but that it was rather the inability of the responsible 
institutions to make good use of it that represented the real problem (ibid., 75). 
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outsourcing to the private firms (44% support relative to 62% for semi-public organisations) 
and second, especially among the EU15, there seems to have been bad experiences in this 
regard, as there is only 25% support for outsourcing to private firms. This seems to suggest 
that the Cohesion policy implementation is rather hard to contract, which makes 
outsourcing of more complex functions to the private sector rather less effective. 
Nevertheless, this notion needs to be treated with caution as outsourcing efficiency and 
rationale should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
4.3 Programming 
4.3.1 Value added 
Programming is generally considered to be one of the strongest features of Cohesion policy 
implementation. It has several qualities playing to its advantage. First, it promotes a 
strategic approach in spending Cohesion policy resources and, at the same time, makes 
decentralisation of decision-making to the Member States easier. Second, the strategic 
approach contributes to better coordination in policy design and can, in turn, also translate 
into improved coordination of policies in the implementation phase. Programme 
preparation and coordination namely put particular emphasis on the internal and external 
consistency of the policies, in this way setting the groundwork for the realisation of 
synergies among different policy fields. Third, the programming approach, by definition, 
requires Member States to improve the logic, objectives and rationale of their foreseen 
operations. This makes monitoring and evaluation easier and, in turn, also improves 
effectiveness. Fourth, programming significantly reduces the uncertainty with regard to the 
policy-mix particular regions or Member States intend to pursue. This allows better long 
term budgetary planning on the public side and, even more importantly, provides potential 
beneficiaries with a stable framework while preparing their own strategies and making their 
own investment decisions. 
The above-mentioned, positive properties of programming are confirmed in the ÖIR (2003) 
study, where the majority of the respondents assessed programming as having “significant 
positive impact on the delivery system”. There are, however, also a few downsides. First, 
the whole programming exercise is a demanding and complex procedure, which does not 
only require skilful administration, but also takes a lot of time. It is not unusual for the 
whole preparation and negotiation procedure to last for two to three years. Furthermore, 
negotiations with the European Commission can also involve unwarranted concessions on 
the side of the Member States, which result out of either generalised policies unjustifiably 
imposed onto particular region (one size fits all problem) or out of an in-build requirement 
for general consensus among the Directorates General of the European Commission who 
might pursue their own “partial interests”. Thirdly, programming can have a detrimental 
effect on experimentation and innovation, an issue to which we will return in the later 
sections. And finally, the programming requirements are the same whatever the financial 
size of the programme, which could be unjustified, as illustrated in Section 4.1.2. 
In our analysis we did not want to directly weigh advantages against disadvantages. Rather 
we wanted to focus on the programming contribution to the basic objectives of Cohesion 
policy, i.e. to what extent does programming actually contribute to the overall impact 
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of disbursed resources. As it turns out, the respondents seem to believe that quite a lot. 
Namely, on average, over half of the impact is attributed to programming and “only” 
48% is supposed to be determined by more detailed implementing provisions, like calls 
for projects. In the EU15 a greater role is attributed to programming (62% of the impact), 
while the highest share can, on average, be found in the Member States with 
regionalised/de-concentrated systems. Our findings support the generally positive image 
of programming, since a significant share of Cohesion policy resources’ impact seems to 
be determined by the quality and appropriateness of the operational programmes. This 
also gives additional leverage to the positive properties listed at the beginning of the 
section. Furthermore, the importance of programming seems to grow with time and 
decentralisation, since more and more operations seem to be financed directly on the 
basis of operational programmes. 
4.3.2 Decision making and allocation of competencies 
Even though programming may be useful, its positive effects in the next step depend on the 
decision-making relationship between the Member States and the European Commission. 
The allocation of competencies is clearly presented in European Commission (2004) which 
ascribes the EC competencies primarily to: (a) ensuring that management and control 
systems exist and are functioning smoothly; and (b) ensuring efficiency of the assistance on 
the basis of regular monitoring and evaluation. This approach can be described as a ‘shared 
management’ model (as defined in Article 14 of the general regulation), as well as 
partnership principle (as defined in Article 11 of the same regulation). Furthermore, Article 
28 of the general regulation stipulates that “the Member State shall prepare the National 
Strategic Reference Framework in dialogue with the Commission, with a view to ensuring a 
common approach”. This means that the European Commission has de jure authority to co-
decide on what should be financed out of Cohesion policy resources, and on how. 
This could be questioned on the theoretical grounds of fiscal federalism (Tiebout 1956, 
Oates, 1968 and 1972, Musgrave 1959) and the more commonly quoted subsidiarity 
principle. Namely, if there is sound theoretical backing for the redistribution function to be 
implemented at the central level, this is not the case with the allocative function, where 
decentralization has definite advantages. As long as Cohesion policy is not seen as a fiscal 
transfer mechanism, i.e. that its objective is not to compensate for income differentials 
but is instead devised to strengthen long term competitive capacity of the recipient areas 
(productivity oriented investment-transfer mechanism), then Cohesion policy has the 
properties of a policy with allocative objective. This view is confirmed, for example, by 
Bailey and De Propris (2002), who argue that Cohesion policy “not only had to redistribute 
resources from the rich to the poor regions/countries, but more importantly ... had to 
trigger or accelerate a process of economic development in the poorest regions/countries 
in order to enable them to compete in the new competitive environment” (ibid., 419). This 
means, in turn, that decentralization brings added value as it “fosters greater 
responsiveness of policy-makers to the tastes of individual jurisdictions” as “the distance 
between citizens (demand) and politicians (supply) on one side, and between citizens and 
the bureaucracy (management and production) on the other, remains as short as possible”, 
which makes “signalling and control ... effective, resulting in a better congruence between 
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public preferences and public policies”, while “political clientelism and bureaucratic rent-
seeking behaviours should be minimized” (Dafflon, 2006: 287). The subsidiarity principle, 
i.e. that decisions should be taken at the higher level only when that same decision cannot 
be taken at the lower level, is in fact already enshrined in the Treaty on the EU (Art. 5) and 
thus also represents one of the basic principles for Cohesion policy (as also specified in the 
preamble of the Cohesion policy regulations). 
Generally speaking, the long-term trend in terms of the allocation of competencies has 
been towards strengthened decentralisation (Bache, 1998; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999; 
Allen, 2000; Pollack 2003). This usually means that the European Commission has remained 
primarily involved only in the decision-making on strategic choices (i.e. structure and 
financial weight of priority axes) and major projects. On the basis of principal agent theory 
Bloom-Hansen, (2005) in fact claims, that it is Member States who “appear to be in full 
control” (ibid., 644). From our own experience, this does sound like an exaggerated 
proposition, as also exemplified, for example, in criticisms that the Commission’s 
comments and influence in the programming process have been of limited added value. In 
fact, the ÖIR (2003) study established that only 36% of respondents support the notion that 
comments from the Commission are seen as useful (ibid., 80). 
This is an important question for the efficiency of Cohesion policy and, in order to check 
the position of our respondents, we firstly wanted to see whether or not the regulation 
itself, in their opinion, gives enough flexibility in terms of what can be financed. As it turns 
out, there seems to be general support for the current scope of operations allowed in 
the regulations, as the average score to question 9 was 4.9, indicating almost perfect 
support for the notion that “there is enough flexibility” in this regard. 
More surprising, however, are the results to the question as to whether the Commission or 
the Member States actually have the decision-making power in determining the policy mix, 
as defined in the operational programmes. The respondents attributed a very high 48% of 
decision-making power to the European Commission, with virtually no variation between 
the EU15 and EU12 Member States. This seems to refute the notion that the major part of 
decision-making power has been transferred to the Member States’ level and is 
consistent with the findings of Bachtler and Mendez (2007), who argue that “the 
Commission’s role has not been weakened, but the way it has exerted its influence has 
changed over time” (ibid., 557). What is more, there seems to be general agreement that 
the balance of decision-making power should shift significantly in favour of the Member 
States. The optimal decision-making share in determining the policy mix was estimated by 
the respondents to be 71%. This gives a strong signal that significant additional effort 
should be put into further strengthening the decentralisation process. 
4.3.3 Structure of operational programmes 
In terms of the structure of the operational programmes, most attention has been given to 
the dilemma of what the relationship should be between sectoral and regional operational 
programmes. According to Boeckhout et al (2002), there is no uniform answer to this 
problem since the solution needs to reflect “the administrative structure and the policy 
culture in the Member States” (ibid., 12). They point out that, as a guiding rule, sectoral 
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programmes should deal with those issues that are priorities from a national development 
perspective, whilst those that are sub-national in nature (e.g. those that are a priority only 
for certain regions) should be dealt with in regional programmes (ROPs). The decision in 
this regard should pay particular attention to who has the responsibility and jurisdiction 
over the operations in question (national or regional level), and also where the co-financing 
comes from. 
Since we clearly cannot make any generalisations as to the a priori efficiency of either of 
these arrangements, we wanted to investigate a related issue, i.e. the question of whether 
or not the relative number of operational programmes (ceteris paribus) has any systematic 
influence on Cohesion policy efficiency. This can be checked at both the general, as well as 
regional, levels. As it turns, out the respondents, on average, believe that a smaller 
number of operational programmes are more efficient (5.8 out of 10 cases), giving 
reasonable support to the notion that multiplying the number of operational programmes 
is detrimental to their efficiency.  
This, however, does not necessarily apply to the regional level, where, on the basis of the 
conclusions in the previous sub-section, one could recommend introducing integrated 
regional operational programmes. These are common operational programmes for more 
regions, each of which, however, has a separate financial envelope specified in the OP. 
Regions thus need to find agreement on the more-or-less common set of priorities and 
activities. In the replies, we found no indication on the basis of which one could generalise 
about superior efficiency of regional vs. integrated regional operational programmes. We 
realised, though, that respondents from the national-centralised Member States have found 
a significantly greater appeal in integrated regional operational programmes. On average, 
they found them more efficient in almost 60% of cases. On this basis, it is reasonable to 
conclude that, in the countries with long established and strong regions, there is no 
sense in introducing integrated regional operational programmes, but that this might be 
an interesting option for Member States with weak regions, both administratively and 
financially. 
4.3.4 Criteria for strategy setting 
The final issue that needs to be addressed in the programming section is about the choices 
Member States and regions face when deciding on the strategy for the use of Cohesion 
policy resources. In the context of strengthened decentralization, this is a particularly 
relevant question, which also touches on the extent to which, or the strictness with which, 
the subsidiarity principle should be implemented - namely, to what extent should European 
priorities be considered in the strategy development for a particular region or Member 
State. 
First, two approaches to the operational programme’s setup need to be differentiated: a 
concentrated one; and one with a broad coverage of those policy areas the operational 
programme is trying to address. There are number of factors that influence such a decision, 
especially the extent of available resources, the administrative capacity of the region as 
well as the socio-economic situation (e.g. one major weakness of a region can make a 
concentrated approach much more obvious). Furthermore, the critical mass consideration 
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for a notice-worthy impact of co-financed activities, ceteris paribus, justifies a 
concentrated approach, even though this can often go against the political preferences. We 
tested the extent to which the decision on an operational programme’s policy area 
coverage influences the efficiency of supported operations. There is some support in 
favour of the concentrated approach (average response score 4.3), which seems to be 
stronger in the EU15 Member States (average response score 3.7). This result probably 
reflects two effects: (1) EU15 countries are now in the context of reduced aid intensities, 
so more concentration naturally follows from this trend; and (2) in times of extensive 
support, a majority of policy areas have benefited, so there is a better awareness of the 
administrative complexity of EU Cohesion policy, justifying only the best performing 
activities being supported with EU resources. In our replies, it is furthermore interesting to 
see that there is significantly greater support for the concentration principle at the higher 
levels (EU and managing authorities have average score of 3.5) than among the 
intermediate bodies and regional level (average score 5.3 and 4.6). This might result from 
the fact that intermediate bodies and the regions have better information on the 
investment possibilities, which tend not to be concentrated. 
The second crucial question in the specification of the operational programmes is the 
criteria that should be taken into account in the strategy setting, as well as in the 
negotiation process. Obviously, we wanted to ask the respondents what criteria were taken 
into account in practice. However, we considered that we would very likely get biased 
results because at least some of the respondents would be unwilling to detail the actual 
process (in particular where political and other negatively perceived interventions etc. 
were applied). For this reason, we focused on the ‘ideal’ situation and asked instead what 
criteria should be used in the specification of strategy and operations in particular. This is a 
widely debated area, not just in terms of the necessary strength of the European vs. 
national priorities, but also in regard to the importance of synergies, geographical 
concentration, consideration of administrative costs etc. In fact Ferry et al (2007), point to 
three broad trends for the 2007-2013 period: (1) a trend to larger and fewer projects, 
which implies greater selectivity; (2) strengthened thematic targeting especially towards 
the Lisbon agenda, but also, for example, in the urban dimension; and (3) a trend towards 
geographical targeting. 
In the questionnaire, we listed 11 possible criteria for strategy setting and asked 
respondents to attach the relative weight on a scale from 0 to 10 (strongest impact) to each 
one of them. The highest score (8.3) was given to the ‘expected impact’ according to the 
‘nationally/regionally defined priority fields’. This was significantly higher than the one 
for “priorities as defined at the EU level” which had a 6.1 average score. This confirms the 
general support for decision-making at the level of the Member States and regions. 
Nevertheless, there also seems to be rather strong preparedness and agreement that EU 
priorities should be taken into account as well. This conclusion somewhat contradicts both 
our finding in Section 4.3.2, and the theoretical considerations of fiscal federalism theory 
and subsidiarity principle, although only partly so, since respondents could suggest that EU 
priorities should be taken into account by the regions and Member States themselves and 
that they do not necessarily need EU level to instruct them for doing so.  
European Policy Research Paper, No 64 35 European Policies Research Centre 
The Micro-efficiency of EU Cohesion Policy  
The second group, according to their relative weight given by the respondents, are the 
following criteria: “Operations should have measurable and visible results” (average score 
7.2), “complementarity among operations - synergies” (6.9) and “catalytic effect”, with an 
average score of 6.6. The message seems to be that, in the framework of the national 
priority actions, those should be selected for co-financing who have: (1) measurable and 
visible results, which is also a preference of the European institutions; (2) who reinforce 
each other’s effects in order to achieve synergies; and (3) actions that would not have 
happened without the EU support - the catalytic effect. In this regard, it should be 
pointed out that synergies seem to be very hard to implement in practice. The ÖIR (2003) 
study points out that “while programming is based on an assumption that the use of the 
different Funds will be integrated in the implementation process, there is little evidence 
that this is in fact the case” (ibid., 126). On the one hand, this is the result of different 
types of operations, especially investment dominated expenditure by ERDF vs. softer, 
human resources related investments by ESF, which tend to have different “resources 
project allocation mechanisms”. On the other hand, this could not, in practice, explain the 
separate implementation of either of the programmes. Important factors in this regard are 
thus institutional considerations on both the national and EU levels. On the latter level, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that there seems to be reservation by the ESF authorities to 
draw ESF monies closer to the ERDF programmes, due to a fear that, with time, this might 
strengthen the argument for joining the two funds together. At the national level, however, 
the implementation of isolated policies seems primarily to be the result of ineffective 
coordination and policy-making. 
The third group of criteria, in terms of their strength, for strategy and operations selection 
in the operational programmes refer to “positive externalities of operations” (average 
score of 6.0), “operations should have quick and predictable absorption capacity” (6.0) and 
“deadweight/displacement/substitution effects of operations” (5.6) criteria. It might be 
argued that giving “visible results” criteria more weight than externalities, deadweight, 
displacement and substitution effects is somewhat surprising. In reality, however, the score 
for these effects is in fact not so much lower. This might also reflect the perception, 
especially on the implementing level, that deadweight, displacement and substitution 
effects are hard to recognise ex ante (the average score for the regional level 
representatives was a very low 3.4), which, in turn, could only disproportionally complicate 
implementation. On the other hand, administrative burdens and problems were given a 
rather high priority. What is interesting to see though is that it is not so much the costs that 
seem to matter (the “Administrative costs of operations” criteria score was only 4.9), but 
rather the influence of administrative considerations on delays and uncertainty in 
implementation. Finally, the lowest scores were given to the two financial criteria - the 
“EU co-financing rates” and “Other available sources of funding, especially EU” - which on 
average were given 4.6 and 4.8 respectively. This seems to suggest that Cohesion policy is 
not about maximising the receipts from the EU, but is instead understood as a means to 
the set objectives, i.e. about the genuine impact operational programmes have been 
devised to achieve. 
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4.4 Project generation, appraisal and selection 
All the decisions and steps presented thus far are immensely important for the efficiency of 
Cohesion policy. Nevertheless, “project generation, appraisal and selection” is the phase 
which determines the projects that will ultimately receive financial support. And it is the 
projects that, at the end of the day, are responsible for the impact Cohesion policy 
resources deliver. The fact that more detailed implementing provisions are responsible for 
almost half of the impact has already been established in Section 4.3.1. It should be taken 
into account, however, that, as also indicated in the ÖIR (2003) study, there is limited 
awareness among beneficiaries of the advantages of the Structural Funds.  Even worse, 
among those that do try to participate in Cohesion policy, there is a feeling that “Structural 
Funds subsidies are not worth the effort” (ibid., 25). 
One of the reasons for such a negative perception is that application and approval 
processes are overly bureaucratic and complex, inflicting disproportionately high costs on 
the applicants and, consequently, driving them away. On the other hand, there are strong 
arguments for introducing more sophisticated appraisal and selection processes, because 
they do not only increase transparency but can directly contribute to the quality of the 
selected projects. Thus, as pointed out by Ferry et al (2007), one of the most crucial 
developments in the implementation systems in the last 15 year has been in the area of 
project appraisal and selection systems. They report that “approaches have gradually 
evolved from a “list of projects” approach to a more sophisticated and co-ordinated 
method of allocating resources to projects” (ibid., 9). Taylor, Bachtler and Rooney (2000), 
go into somewhat more detail and explain that, prior to 1989, the funding decisions were in 
fact taken by the European Commission. This was followed by a period in which priority has 
been put on maximisation of control over Structural Funds and the retrieval of the monies 
from Brussels. Between 1989 and 1994 there was little systematic project appraisal, and 
the operational programmes tended to give preference to a limited number of rather few, 
but large, projects. It was only in the following programming period, which also broadened 
the scope of interventions towards softer measures, that more systematic and co-ordinated 
methods of allocating resources started to be introduced. Ferry et al (2007) expanded on 
this, arguing that more systematic and co-ordinated methods also increased complexity, 
which in 2000-2006 already spurred calls for more streamlined, but also more competitive 
systems. The ultimate objective thus remains to ensure efficient, transparent and flexible 
allocation mechanisms. 
In order to better understand the resource allocation problem, one needs to go deeper into 
the relationship between the public sector in the function of “transfer-distributing 
authority” and the applicants. The core of the problem lies in the information asymmetry 
and consequent adverse incentive mechanisms. As pointed out by Horvat (2005: 103), 
“economic agents proposing projects have the incentive to reap rents and have better 
information about the returns on these projects than the principals allocating the 
transfers”. The public authority is compelled to make decisions on the basis of information 
provided by the agents and is, at the same time, also under pressure to act as quickly as 
possible in order to satisfy both the absorption dynamics (as required by the N+2 rule), as 
well as to “satisfy their constituencies which may be highly influenced by the lobbying 
efforts of rent-seekers (e.g. a firm claiming to create or preserve a number of jobs, but 
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only if it gets public support)”. The presented moral hazard and asymmetric information 
problem is compounded by the public sector’s vulnerability to public choice considerations, 
i.e. to making sub-optimal decisions due to the election cycle, rent-seeking behaviour by 
the public sector and median voter problem (ibid.).  
There are, however, additional, objective reasons for the intrinsic conflict relationship 
between the “transfer-distributing authority” and the recipients. First, the public sector 
needs to ensure accountability and transparency, which represents one of the reasons for 
red tape. Processes need to be documented since the audit institutions require proof for 
years back, i.e. they ask the public authority to reconstruct the arguments for their 
decisions, thus inducing even more paperwork. Second, due to the multi-level governance 
structure, the regional and national levels respectively need to report to the higher levels, 
which again puts an administrative burden on the applicant. Finally, the “transfer-
distributing authority” is usually faced with greater demand than the available resources so 
it must, as much as possible, ensure objectivity in decision-making, an issue whose 
consequences we shall turn to later. 
On the other hand, these circumstances tend not to be apparent to the applicant, who is 
usually focused only on his or her project and is, therefore, not knowledgeable about the 
regulatory environment and circumstances of the public sector. Furthermore, applicants 
are used to private sector practices, which, to a certain extent, can be applied also in the 
public sector, but certainly not predominantly so. The basic reason for such a constraint in 
the framework of project appraisal and selection is the illegitimacy of the decision, which 
would be based on subjective considerations. Thus, the applicants, based on anecdotal 
evidence, tend to consider any administration as redundant, which makes the relationship 
between the applicant and the administration a notoriously conflicting one. Nevertheless, 
every effort needs to be made to keep this conflict to the minimum possible, as this 
directly influences the efficiency of Cohesion policy resources. What choices Member States 
and regions have in this regard is the topic of the following sub-sections. 
4.4.1 Project generation 
Project generation seems to receive different attention in different systems, even though 
the quality of project proposals is what, in fact, determines the final impact of the 
operational programmes. The reasons lie predominantly in the extent of the demand for 
public resources relative to supply (the larger the demand, the lower the incentive for the 
implementing bodies to get involved in project generation). Also, Member States and 
regions with the differentiated systems seem to place more attention on project 
generation. The reason for this is basically that “projects are generated by the existence of 
the programmes” (Taylor et al (2000: 30) to a much greater extent than in the integrated 
systems, which forces the implementing bodies to be much more active in making sure 
there are enough projects available. In the integrated systems, the extent of project 
generation activity rests much more on the attitude of the particular implementing body.  
The project generation phase can, in principle, be divided into two separate dimensions: 
(1) the generation of the project idea; and (2) the administrative work in order to get the 
project approved and then also to receive the funding from the implementing body. With 
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regard to the former, the generation of the project ideas depends, to a great extent, on 
real as well as administrative absorption capacity as defined by Mrak and Wostner (2004). If 
the former cannot be influenced by the public sector, because the extent of the real needs 
that can be justified for the public support is more-or-less given, the latter certainly can. 
The extent to which real needs will actually be addressed by the operational programmes 
depends, firstly, on the capacity of the potential applicants to get involved in the project 
implementation. In order to increase the number of, or extent to which, potential 
applicants actually get involved, some administrations and secretariats will facilitate and 
support involvement of potential project-holders. This can either be in the form of 
information campaigns, training, workshops etc. Secondly, of all the potential applicants, 
only those actually aware that there is available funding will get involved. This is especially 
relevant in the systems that use calls for projects, where timing is also very important. 
Finally, of those that got involved, only those that can successfully manage all the 
administrative work required for the application, as well as the required administration 
work during implementation, will actually receive funding. 
Project facilitation and advice can be done internally by the administrations, or can be 
outsourced. Ferry et al (2007) differentiate among: (a) support given at the programme 
level; (b) sub-regional support and “multiplier structures”; and (c) external support. The 
first refers to those cases where support and advice is provided directly by the managing 
authorities and secretariats, or in their name established one-stop-shops. The second refers 
to broader and more extensive support, whose objective is to be as close to the applicant 
as possible (especially important with softer measures), which require larger network of 
support institutions. In all circumstances, including the one with external support, it is 
crucial that there is full conformity of interpretation and understanding of framework 
conditions between the managing authority (or the body granting support) and the support 
structures. Namely, in the preparatory phase it is never possible to foresee all the possible 
eventualities. This means that new, unforeseen circumstances can arise in the project 
preparation phase. The support systems, therefore, must take the need for common 
interpretation into account, so that the same programme will enable the same framework 
conditions for all the potential applicants, whoever they get support from. 
Advice and support given directly by the managing authorities, intermediate bodies or 
secretariats is, in principle, the most desirable form, since these institutions are the ones 
who make the decisions and have the best information and overview. Taylor et al (2000), 
argue that “pro-active approaches to project operation, involving face-to-face contact 
between programme managers and applicants, are more likely to be successful than passive 
methods” (ibid., 61). At the same time, it should be realised that the capacity of 
programme managers to provide such services tends to be limited, not least due to staffing 
and remuneration limitations of the public sector. The external, outsourced support can 
thus represent an efficient bridge between the applicant and the public sector, but only 
provided that the market for the provision of these services is developed enough. In this 
case, the competition and specialisation ensure quality service for an acceptable price, 
which is, of course, crucial for the applicant. It has to be borne in mind that, even though 
Cohesion policy is a European policy, the market for these services is still differentiated 
because EU regulations are always integrated in the national administrative systems in a 
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context-specific way. This means that there is always local know-how that needs to be 
ensured. In our questionnaire, we asked to what extent the respondents perceived the 
market for providing services in project generation and administration to be seriously 
underdeveloped (zero points) to well developed (10 points). The average score was 4.8, 
which seems to suggest that there are some support services which can be outsourced, 
but that a lot still needs to be done directly by the responsible institutions. It is 
interesting to note that there is no difference between the situation in the EU15 and the 
EU12 Member States. There is, however, a lower score from the group of “intermediate 
bodies” that are actually the ones that implement the majority of projects and calls for 
projects (average score of 3.9). This suggests that the institutions responsible for the 
implementation of Cohesion policy should either strengthen their own efforts in giving 
advice and support to the applicants and/or should get involved in market making 
activities so that the quality of the market provided services would increase.  
A special case in project generation is public investments. Responsibility for their 
implementation usually lies directly with national and regional public authorities. These 
projects tend to be larger and take a long time to prepare. Due to specialised institutions 
with clear responsibility there usually is no significant problems with the ability to prepare 
projects per se. Rather, these institutions might be faced, firstly, with a problem with the 
quality of their planning which is, among other things, conditioned by the decision-making 
quality and speed that is often outside of their (full) control and, secondly, with the 
problem of costs associated with the preparation of the project documentation, which can 
represent a noticeable share of total project costs (e.g. extensive set of permits and plans, 
as well as comprehensive cost-benefit analyses, environmental impact assessments, etc.). 
The whole process gets even more complicated where there are possibilities for public-
private-partnerships, which in terms of timing additionally prolong the project preparation 
phase and make it even more complex. All these elements need to be taken into account by 
the managing authorities, in order to ensure smooth and efficient implementation of the 
operational programmes.  
4.4.2 Allocating money to intermediaries 
The legal basis for allocating resources in Cohesion policy is the approved operational 
programmes, while, institutionally, the overall responsibility rests with the managing 
authority. We have seen numerous institutional setups in the previous sections and how 
implementing structures can be organised. This clearly also has repercussions for the 
allocation of money. Ferry et al (2007: 49), broadly differentiate among three approaches: 
• programmes which divide the funding envelope at the start of the programme and 
channel the funding through domestic budget lines or through intermediate bodies, 
which are then responsible for organising allocations to projects; 
• programmes where resources are directly allocated to projects by the managing 
authority; and 
• programmes which operate a combination of allocations to intermediate bodies, 
and allocations directly to projects. 
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We will be looking at the ways of allocating money to projects in the next sub-section, but 
here the focus lies on the relationship between the managing authority and the 
intermediate bodies, i.e. on the question of how these relationships can be organised. We 
have already established in Section 4.2.1. that, especially in the initial stages of 
introducing new implementation structures, a strong coordinating institution is generally 
welcomed. In the framework of its overall responsibility however, the following principles 
need to be taken into account when determining relationships with the intermediate 
bodies: 
First, the system needs to allow and promote flexibility and adaptability to the changed 
circumstances, as well as new, innovative approaches in particular policy fields. This is 
especially relevant for the first group of programmes above, which divide the available 
envelope at the start of the programme. Even though this is done, the managing authority 
needs to retain the jurisdiction as well as mechanism to reallocate the money to either new 
instruments (that still comply with the operational programmes) or new intermediate 
bodies. 
Such a system needs to have an incentive mechanism that promotes competition and, 
thus, allocates money to the best performing intermediate bodies. The competition 
principle represents the second guiding principle. In this regard it is particularly important 
to avoid monopolisation of particular activities by one institution. This can often be the 
case for public or quasi-public institutions, which might get exclusive responsibility for a 
particular activity. In such a system, it is very hard for the managing authority to monitor 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the supported operations.  
Second, the intermediate bodies to which the money is allocated need to be accountable 
and need the proper institutional capacity to implement the activities entrusted to them 
by the managing authority. This again requires careful contracting, an issue which we have 
already addressed in Section 4.2.3.  
In terms of practical aspects, Ferry et al (2007) list four arrangements for allocating money 
to intermediate bodies, i.e. on the basis of the following: 
a) single stream budgets combine Structural Funds and domestic funding, which can 
be rather efficient for administering but can also pose coordination problems and 
complexities if not properly managed; 
b) allocation of funding “blocks” where only EU money is allocated to a pre-
determined or selected organisations on the basis of competitive call, which need 
to find their own co-financing from their own or other sources. An example of such 
an approach are global grants; 
c) strategic thematic or geographical partnerships are dedicated groups of partners 
who take over the responsibility for the delivery of particular parts of 
programmes. Such an approach has the advantage of strong motivational element, 
which promotes inclusive approach to development, however, can be rather 
problematic in terms of accountability and institutional capacity. 
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d) new financial instruments where management is allocated to a special fund, which 
operates as financial intermediary (e.g. risk capital funds). 
4.4.3 Allocating money to projects 
We described the evolution of project selection mechanisms in the introduction to Section 
4.4, where it was established that these mechanisms have become increasingly 
sophisticated and complex. According to ÖIR (2003), there is general consensus that 
“project selection processes contributes to the quality, transparency, accountability and 
credibility of the system” (ibid., 133). They also list number of advantages and 
disadvantages of the project selection mechanisms: 
Table 5: Advantages and disadvantages of project selection 
Advantages and positive spill-over effects Disadvantages and negative spill-over effects 
− Increases transparency in the allocation of 
resources for projects. 
− Increases the quality of project preparation. 
− Increases the project assessment and 
evaluation skills of those involved in process. 
− Involves better use of cost benefit and value 
for money analyses in policy situations. 
− Increases awareness of the value of 
evaluation techniques in the public sector. 
 
− Administrative burden on project promoters 
is very high. The system fails to distinguish 
between small and large projects in this 
regard. 
− Reduces flexibility and speed of reaction to 
innovative and dynamic situations. 
− Can result in standardised projects driven by 
the nature of the application process and the 
selection criteria. 
− Only ‘safe’ projects get through. No 
allowance for ‘risk’ ventures. 
− There are many different models for project 
selection throughout the European Union. As 
a result the experience is not uniform. 
− Many worthwhile projects from small 
promoters never reach the application stage 
because they feel it is not worth the trouble. 
− Project assessment for technical projects 
requiring specialist knowledge is often 
outsourced to external experts. This reduces 
the capacity of the public sector to make 
informed judgements. 
Source: ÖIR (2003: 133) 
(i) On what level? 
Before taking a closer look at different mechanisms for project selection, we want to 
address the question of what level is, ceteris paribus, best suited for decision making. In 
this regard the ÖIR (2003) study suggests that “project selection seems to be tackled more 
pro-actively in decentralised contexts and in smaller programmes, whereas centrally 
managed programmes and bigger ones still often struggle for getting reasonable procedures 
in place” (ibid., 90). This can be especially problematic in already bureaucratic 
administrative systems where Structural Funds additional requirements tend to make 
matters worse. 
At the same time, it has to be recognised that the issue of project selection is a 
predominantly national/regional matter. The European Commission has retained its 
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decision-making powers only for projects whose total cost is greater than €50 million (€25 
million in the field of environment)11. We have already presented the theoretical 
arguments as to why decision-making should be made as close to the people as possible in 
Section 4.3.2. However, we also wanted to inquire about the experience of our 
respondents. We thus asked “to what extent does European Commission’s project approval 
(major projects) contribute to selected-project quality on a scale between 0 - not at all - 
and 10 - significantly”. It turns out that there seems to be reasonable acceptance of the 
Commission’s role in project-level decision-making as the average score was 5.6, with no 
significant variation between the Member States and the types of institutions the 
respondents came from. This could be explained in a number of ways: first, that the 
Member States and the regions consider major projects as highly risky because of the 
monies involved and therefore welcome the shared responsibility (reduction of uncertainty 
in the latter stages); second, that they accept that major projects should also have a 
European dimension, thus that apart from the contribution to the convergence of the 
region/Member State in question, major projects should also posses straightforward 
“European value-added”; third, it has already been argued in ÖIR (2003), that the 
obligatory cost-benefit analyses and the separate approval by the European Commission 
increase the rationality in decision-making, among others, due to the reduced possibilities 
of decision-making based on political pressure (ibid., 93). 
The second issue we wanted to investigate was the decision-making relationship between 
the national and the regional level. Firstly, we wanted to inquire to what extent the 
decision-making is presently (actually) performed at each level. The replies suggest that on 
average 35% of the decision-making is done at the regional level, with this share being 
significantly higher in the EU15 (67%) and significantly lower in the EU12 Member States 
(26%). This is an expected result and is not such an important conclusion, since there are 
also marked differences among the Member States themselves. There is, however, a very 
strong message for the EU12 in terms of the optimal decision-making relationship. Namely, 
there is overwhelming support for additional decentralisation of decision-making in the 
EU12 Member States to the regional level.  The respondents, on average, considered that 
the optimal relationship between the national and regional level would be 50:50. The 
regional representatives in both EU15 and EU12 would naturally want to go even further, as 
their average optimal allocation of decision making would be 75% for the EU15 and 70% for 
the EU12 in favour of the regions. This might be somewhat overdone but additional 
decentralisation of decision making in the EU12 does seem to have strong and uniform 
support, in spite of all the reservations put forward by Bachtler and McMaster (2007). 
(ii) Mechanisms for project appraisal and selection 
The best way to illustrate the complexity of the project generation, appraisal and selection 
processes is to look at the average time needed to get from a project idea to the actual 
start of the project implementation. We have asked this question in our questionnaire for 
                                                 
11 Article 39 of the general regulation. 
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four types of projects: major infrastructure projects; smaller infrastructure projects; 
productive investment projects; and human resources related projects. The longest time to 
get a project started is obviously needed for major infrastructure projects (on average 26.8 
months according to our respondents). This is followed by smaller infrastructure projects 
where 15.2 months is needed on average. For productive investment and human resources 
related projects, 12.2 and 9.9 months is needed respectively. Thus, in planning an 
operational programme, it should be born in mind that there are, on average, around 1.5 
to 2.5 years delay for the implementation of infrastructure projects, and around half to 
one and a half years delay for productive investment and human resources related 
programmes. Of course, the time needed can vary significantly depending on a particular 
project and also on the exact modalities of the implementation systems. We can observe, 
for example, that the EU12 countries seem to be less time-efficient in all project types 
apart from small infrastructure projects - the time difference is two months on average, 
while for small infrastructure projects EU12 seem to require 1.5 months less than the EU15 
Member States. An even bigger variation is seen among the different implementation 
systems. We can confirm the findings of ÖIR (2003), as well as our conclusions from Section 
4.2.2, that a de-concentrated approach, especially if it involves several levels of 
decision making, is less time-efficient. The time required for project approval in de-
concentrated systems seems to be significantly longer, even up to 60% in case of major 
infrastructure projects. This time efficiency needs to play a very prominent role in deciding 
on the project allocation mechanisms. 
According to Ferry et al (2007), there are basically two approaches to allocating funding to 
projects: on the basis of so called “call systems”, which rely on some kind of invitation to 
potential beneficiaries to submit projects applications; or on the basis of so called 
“strategic projects”, which are chosen and approved directly by the responsible institution.  
(iii) Call systems 
Call systems have the advantage of being transparent - they improve public awareness of 
the given policy objective, which in turn provides an additional incentive for economic 
actors to change their behaviour in the desired direction (e.g. stimulating a general 
investment cycle in a sector even though only some of the potential beneficiaries will 
actually receive the funding).  Due to their competition-based approach, call systems also 
contribute to the quality of the generated projects. On the other hand, due to their pre-set 
standards they can become overly bureaucratic and unfriendly for the project promoters, 
because they can make the relationship between the applicant and funding institution more 
distant and formal and, also, they might give false impression of the more objective 
selection procedures, which, it is sometimes argued, are misused for “political purposes”. 
As far as the administrative dimension is concerned, Mrak and Wostner (2004), have argued 
that the extent of administrative burden for the applicant needs to be proportionate to 
the anticipated benefits for the applicant (taking into account the likelihood of receiving 
the funding). Such a principle generally means that, for more sophisticated and financially-
heavy projects, more extensive documentation should clearly be required but, at the same 
time, that the whole appraisal need not necessarily be done in one step. Namely, it can be 
much friendlier for applicants to get the first feedback on a shortened requirement list, 
which gives them the framework conditions for the project’s structure. Only at the second 
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stage should they be asked to submit the whole, required documentation. Such an approach 
can save both money and time for applicants, rendering the selection process more 
efficient. 
According to Ferry et al (2007), call systems can generally be differentiated in a number of 
ways. First, one can differentiate between “continuous calls” and “calls with fixed 
deadlines”. Continuous calls invite projects without any time limitations on submissions, 
until the available funding is exhausted. Their advantage according to Taylor et al (2000), is 
that projects can be fully developed and project promoters are not then rushed into 
premature submission. A problem might appear in such cases, however, as time pressure 
can have detrimental effects on the project’s quality, especially in terms of its strategic 
orientation. It is inherent in continuous call systems that projects are appraised as they 
arrive (i.e. on a first-come-first-served basis). At the end of the day, this can result in the 
best projects not being selected because the funding has dried up. On the other hand, calls 
with fixed deadlines face a problem of immature project proposals being submitted, as well 
as the problem of concentrated workloads for the administration. However, they may be 
better equipped to introduce more sophisticated quality selection criteria which will 
promote the strategic dimension of projects. Increasingly, a mixed type of calls system is 
being used, i.e. a fixed deadline call, which allows more than one deadline for project 
submission. This can combine some of the positive qualities of both approaches; however, 
in such cases, attention needs to be put into the time-management of such calls. It is 
important to ensure that the results of one call opening are known early enough for the 
unsuccessful applicants to update their bids for the new call opening. 
Second, calls can be differentiated in terms of their openness and selectivity. Some 
Member States invite projects on a broad, rather unrestricted basis, i.e. requiring project 
proposals to comply only with the eligibility criteria which, apart from the usual 
“compliance with the strategic objective of the programming document” or priority axis, 
tend to be of a rather formal nature. Such an approach might be relevant for small projects 
or cases where demand significantly falls behind the available funding; however it is much 
less likely in cases where only projects with genuine added value would be selected, and/or 
those projects where public support is actually needed. On the other hand, selective calls 
are much more restrictive in terms of their appeal to potential project promoters. 
However, their selection criteria are exactly the means through which the public interest 
can be encouraged, because project promoters would adapt their activities towards the 
desired direction. This positive feature of restrictive selection criteria does, however, 
increase the workload for the selection committees, thus prolonging selection processes. It 
might also be discouraging or biased against more innovative and risky projects, resulting 
sometimes in the criticism that such an approach is stimulating the production of 
standardised projects12. The ÖIR (2003) study argues that even standardised projects can be 
innovative, provided that “innovation has been build into strategy” (ibid., 135). On the 
                                                 
12 According to the ÖIR (2003), study, it is decentralised systems in particular that are especially 
vulnerable to project standardisation. 
European Policy Research Paper, No 64 45 European Policies Research Centre 
The Micro-efficiency of EU Cohesion Policy  
basis of our experience and anecdotal evidence, we see the problem of innovation more in 
the light of the jurisdiction of selection committees to make their decisions on the basis of 
a more quality (instead of quantified) criteria which, of course, also allows for more 
subjectivity. The more there is quality assessment in the process, the more conducive it is 
to innovation, although also more susceptible for “in-transparent decision-making”. Taylor 
et al (2000) in fact differentiate between the “automatic yes/no systems” which leave no 
room for discretion, but are, at the same time, insensitive to variation in quality and 
between “scoring systems” which give an enhanced role to appraised judgement (which 
however is subjective in its nature). 
The issue of transparency will be addressed in a later sub-section. We did, however, 
enquire about the qualities of open or selective calls in our questionnaire. In the replies, 
there is some preference given to more open calls (average score was 4.3), but it is 
instructive to see that, in the EU15 Member States, support for such an approach seems to 
be much greater (average score 3.4). This seems to indicate that longer experience and 
better know-how, as well as longer democratic tradition, and therefore greater trust in 
politics, are conducive to more open calls, which allow for more innovation, as well as 
more subjectivity. Where this is not the case, preference seems to be given to stricter, 
more quantified approaches, where the political sphere has less room for intervention. 
Interestingly, however, the greatest support for open calls comes from the regional level 
(average score 2.4), where, due to their “closeness to the people”, there seems to be a  
closer relationship and mutual recognition between project promoters and funding 
institutions. 
(iv) Strategic projects 
The second approach to allocating money to projects is on the basis of a “strategic 
projects” selection process, which is, by definition, non-competitive. Instead projects are 
selected on the basis of some kind of consensus, the modalities of which depend on the 
type of the strategic projects. In all cases, the projects can be identified during the 
programming process13 or during the implementation phase. According to Ferry et al 
(2007), there are four type of strategic projects. 
a) Major projects are large, complex projects, which also require separate approval 
procedure by the European Commission if their total cost is over €50 million or €25 
million in the field of environment (refer to Section 4.4.3(i)). Such projects tend 
to be “flagship”, distinctly visible projects, which consequently focus only on a 
limited number of issues as well as beneficiaries. They tend to be dominated by 
managing authorities or/and national ministries. 
b) Negotiated projects are similar to the major projects in terms of their importance 
and size however there is a difference in their generation and selection. Namely 
                                                 
13 Ferry et al (2007) conclude that “the use of pre-selection appears to be decreasing in most of the 
EU15 Member States” (ibid., 58). 
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for such an approach it is typical that projects are generated and/or selected on 
the basis of the partnership principle, often on the sub-national level. Such an 
approach is still a top-down approach in its nature however it gives more attention 
also to the bottom-up initiatives and consensus building. The extent to which this 
is the case, of course, depends on the coordinator and the extent to which an 
inclusive approach is used. 
c) Complex projects are projects that are composed of more parts financed from 
different operational programmes and generated jointly by a number of managing 
authorities (e.g. combining hard investment with human resources development), 
usually on a specific issue or topic. 
d) Groups of projects are similar to complex projects but are predominantly 
prepared by the project applicants. This can be in the interests of the managing 
authority because in this way some of the administrative workload can be 
transferred to the project management. 
The main weakness of the strategic project selection approach is certainly the non-
competitive nature of project selection, which also has a tendency to result in less 
transparency14 (decision-making is to a much greater extent top-down based). On the other 
hand, strategic project, if managed properly, can have as a consequence reduced and more 
streamlined administrative processes. Taking all of the above into account, it seems 
reasonable to argue that a strategic project selection process should be used in those 
cases where the project in question is “quasi-monopolised” in nature (either because of 
the nature of the activity or because of the single possible beneficiary) or where 
successful project implementation requires such a broad scope of partners that the 
competition would be meaningless or that the administrative costs would be 
prohibitive. Cases, for example, include waste management systems (where economic 
costs pre-determine the minimum level of users and thus the projects), risk prevention 
measures (where there clearly needs to be top-down coordination of activities taken by a 
large number of actors) or even national/regional business zones (where geography and 
initial conditions might pre-determine who would be the beneficiary). 
(v) Transparency and selection process 
The quality of selected projects crucially depends on the transparency of the decision-
making process. In turn, this is dependent on the governance quality. This is usually closely 
related to the advancement of the political sphere and the level of trust vested in it. We 
have already put forward the public sector constraints in terms of public choice 
considerations in the introduction to Section 4.4. This cannot be totally eliminated, even in 
the most advanced administrations and democracies. Thus both call as well as strategic 
                                                 
14 Cleary this can only be argued on average, since selection committees making use of the call 
systems are also questioned on their neutrality or might be constrained by lack of expertise, 
resources and adequate data (Taylor et. al, 2000: 38). 
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projects selection systems should aim to produce transparent, replicable and objective 
results. This can be achieved to a greater or lesser extent in a number of ways.  
We enquired in our questionnaire as to what type of selection process and, in particular, 
selection committee “come closest to selecting best available projects”, ranging from 
government decision or managing authority/intermediate body decision only or a selection 
process involving multi-departmental selection committees, perhaps also including external 
independent experts or even the foreign ones. Taking into account the results from the 
open calls question, we would also expect that results would significantly differ between 
the EU15 and EU12 Member States. This is fully confirmed in the results as the only 
universal conclusion for the two groups is a low approval rate for the direct governmental 
decision-making (average score 5.6 for the EU12 and 5.2 for the EU15 Member States). The 
EU15 Member States then have significantly greater trust in the managing 
authorities/intermediate bodies’ internal appraisal procedures, since the average score 
increases to 6.0, while for the EU12 Member States the trust level falls, relative to the 
direct governmental decision-making, to 5.5. The EU15 Member States have highest trust 
(average score 7.0) in the multi-departmental decision-making by the MA/IB, but are 
wary of the involvement of independent experts (score of 6.0), and even more wary of  
foreign experts (score of 5.6). EU12 Member States do not seem to trust single 
authorities and seem to feel greater assurance in broader institutional involvement in 
the appraisal process. Thus, the EU12 Member States certainly approve of involvement of 
independent experts, including foreign ones (average scores 7.6 and 7.7 respectively), but 
are somewhat less fond of MA/IB decision-making based on multi-departmental selection 
committees (average score 6.6). This again confirms that political tradition and trust in 
political systems significantly determines the optimal selection process in the 
framework of strategic project selection systems.  
(vi) Small vs. large projects 
Bachtler et al (2006) report that a number of countries have put more and more emphasis 
on larger, key projects, or at least on integrated groups of smaller projects, with the 
intention to “strengthen the strategic impact of projects” (ibid., 68). The debate on the 
value added of larger and smaller projects is as long as Cohesion policy itself and is clearly 
dependent on the particular socio-economic situation, as well as the quality of project 
generation, selection and implementation systems as a whole. It is for this reason that we 
have not asked about this issue in the questionnaire. We wanted, however, to identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of both kinds of projects. 
Larger projects, by definition, mean a smaller number of co-financed projects, which 
makes monitoring of the co-financed projects easier. Large projects are, ceteris paribus, 
also associated with less administration per monetary unit and are easier to control. Large 
projects tend to be infrastructure related projects, which might also require introduction of 
complementary activities (e.g. human resources development). On the one hand, it is 
easier to introduce such complementarities where there are a limited number of large 
projects; on the other hand, however, the increased project complexity can reduce some of 
the savings in administration. More importantly, larger projects are associated with 
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significantly higher risk for the managing authorities of “not spending money in time” if 
something goes wrong with the project, or even if there are just simple delays associated 
with, e.g. acquiring legal permits etc. Such delays are common with larger projects, as 
reported by Gross and Davies (2007). Due to their size, large projects also significantly 
reduce the flexibility of the manager in the implementation phase, should there be a 
change, for example, in the socio-economic situation of the recipient region. Finally, as 
already indicated in the previous sub-section, larger projects are far more susceptible to 
political pressure, which can have detrimental consequences on the impact of Cohesion 
policy resources.  
Smaller projects, on the other hand, tend to be more demanding in terms of management 
requirements and are thus associated with a greater administrative burden per monetary 
unit spent. For example, human resources related projects need to keep track of each 
individual who has benefited from the programme, even though the amount of money spent 
might be minimal. A larger number of supported projects require more advanced project 
generation and selection mechanisms, as well as good monitoring systems.  Together, these 
can ensure transparent project selection and management. It is crucial that administrative 
and implementation system requirements, both for the beneficiary as well as 
administration, are kept to the minimum necessary taking into account the principle from 
section 4.4.3(iii): the extent of the administrative burden needs to be proportionate to the 
anticipated benefits for the applicant. Admittedly, this can sometimes be difficult to 
ensure, due to formal requirements. For this reason, it is even more important that smaller 
projects get EU co-financing only for those parts of their activities that are easier to 
control, and not necessarily for all of the costs associated with the project, as long as this 
does not disproportionately increase the administrative burden. 
Thus, both large and small projects have advantages and disadvantages. Larger projects are 
more visible in themselves; however, a larger number of smaller projects also mean a 
significantly greater coverage of potential beneficiaries, areas and possibly also 
opportunities and challenges. As already indicated, it is not possible to come to a general 
conclusion about what kind of projects have greater impact. On the basis of the above-
mentioned arguments, however, it is clear that, in countries and regions with efficient 
implementation systems, smaller projects can have comparatively at least as great an 
impact as larger projects. 
4.5 Financial management and controls 
According to Boeckhout et al (2002), financial management and controls are one of the 
most important phases in the framework of systems and procedures. They have been 
receiving increasing attention with every reform of Cohesion policy, making them now a top 
priority for the Member States (ÖIR, 2003). Financial management and controls are 
immensely important, not just due to the “sound financial management” requirement, but 
also because all the required processes designed to ensure compliance, both within the 
administration and with the beneficiaries, can be made prohibitively high. 
The overall objective of financial management and control systems is thus to ensure 
legality and regularity of transactions, as well as compliance with the principles of 
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economy, efficiency and effectiveness (sound financial management requirement). This can 
be split down into more specific tasks. First, in terms of financial management, Member 
States need to ensure that “the beneficiaries receive the total amount of the public 
contribution as quickly as possible and in full” (Art. 80 of the general regulation). Obviously 
public contributions can be made only against expenditures declared that are: (1) real; (2) 
for the products or services that have been delivered in accordance with the approval 
decision; (3) the applications for reimbursement by the beneficiary must be correct; and (4) 
the operations and expenditure must comply with Community and national rules, without 
any possibility of double-financing with any other Community or national schemes and with 
other programming periods (Art. 13 of Commission Regulation 1828/2006).  
In order to comply with these standards, Member States are required to set up complex 
management and control systems, where particular attention has been given to the division 
and description of responsibilities, taking due account of the principle of separation of 
functions (Art. 58 of the general regulation), establishment of financial flows, together with 
the required documentation flow from the European Commission to the beneficiary and 
backwards in case of recoveries (audit trails) and crucially the control provisions, which 
need to be specified in detail (specification of responsibilities, control lists, risk analyses 
where sample checks are used, etc).  
Even though the number of checks and controls has all but reached prohibitive levels, the 
Court of Auditors still found that “the Commission does not maintain effective 
supervision to mitigate the risk that the controls delegated to the Member States fail to 
prevent reimbursement of overstated or ineligible expenditure“ (European Court of 
Auditors, 2006: 128) since “control failures were found in all of the audited programmes” 
(ibid., 120). Furthermore, the European Court of Auditors is reasonably confident that, for 
the budgetary year 2006, “at least 12% of the total amount reimbursed to Structural 
Policies projects should not have been reimbursed” (European Court of Auditors, 2007: 
152). On the other hand the ÖIR (2003) study found that only 38% of respondents agreed 
with the proposition that “financial procedures are seen as necessary and work well” (ÖIR, 
2003: 103). The same study also found that only 55% of respondents believe financial 
procedures have a positive impact, while the corresponding figure for control mechanisms 
is an even lower 50%. It is true that we have found that 45% of the administrative 
procedures are due to the national legislation. Nevertheless, the financial management 
and especially control provisions are in fact very closely regulated on the side of the 
Commission, so national authorities cannot be predominantly “blamed” for perceived 
ineffectiveness of management and control systems. The following table lists some of the 
major concerns as expressed in the ÖIR (2003) study. 
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Table 6: Advantages and disadvantages of financial management and control systems 
Advantages and positive spill-over effects Disadvantages and negative spill-over effects 
− Increased accountability and transparency. 
− The N+2 rule encourages speedy implementation 
of the projects and absorption of funds. 
− There are fewer irregularities in the use of 
public funds. 
 
− Significantly increased work load and level of 
bureaucracy. 
− The requirement for 100% certification 
frequently leads to delays in disbursement of 
funds. 
− Differences in the interpretation of eligibility of 
expenditure between the Commission and the 
Member State/Region lead to a lot of insecurity 
and a tendency to err on the side of caution. 
− Inflexible arrangements for transfer of funds 
between priorities and measures in programme 
(there is no ceiling or limit of flexibility…). 
− The N+2 rules discourage innovation and 
militate against quality in favour of speed and 
quantity. 
− There is no built -n risk management in the 
model capable of handling risk in the way it is 
handled in, e.g. venture funds. 
− Duplication of systems as a result of different 
legislative demands of national and EC systems. 
− The fear of irregularities induces an 
overcautious approach. 
− Formal requirements for projects are applied 
regardless of the project size. In the case of 
small projects this leads to a lack of proportion 
between the level of funding and the 
administrative effort involved. 
Source: ÖIR (2003: 144); slightly generalised by the author 
Clearly, the concerns raised above refer to the legal requirements and practices that 
applied to the 2000-2006 period, and some of the shortcomings were partly eliminated or at 
least reduced for the 2007-2013 period. Among such reforms, we could mention: 
decentralisation of eligibility rules to the Member State level (Art. 56 of the general 
regulation); a more strategic approach in programming with the elimination of Programme 
Complements and measures; payments to be calculated on the priority axis level. All of this 
should give greater flexibility to the Member States. The new requirements still need to be 
tested in practice. There are already concerns, however, that, for example, the description 
of management and controls systems is already “more detailed and complex than in 2000-
2006” (Gross and Davies 2007: 35). Furthermore, due to the multilevel governance model 
with “the Commission remaining ultimately responsible for the regularity of structural 
operations expenditure” (Court of Auditors, 2006: 118), it is doubtful whether the above-
mentioned reforms would bring about noticeable simplifications. There might be a 
potential positive impact, however, from the new Lisbon Treaty, which changes previous 
article 274 of the Treaty in that “The Commission shall implement the budget in 
cooperation with the Member States” (the text in italics is new). 
Our approach in tackling the issue of financial management and control, is based on a 
horizontal logic, since Member State’s practices differ significantly in line with their 
institutional practice and tradition. In other words, we will break down the problem of 
inefficient financial management and controls into two dimensions. 
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1. The time- and cost-efficiency of the system. The sound financial management 
principle is a prerequisite for the use of Cohesion policy resources; however, the 
framework condition is that “the extent and intensity of checking should make an 
appropriate balance between the overall cost of operating those checks and the 
overall benefits they bring” (European Court of Auditors, 2004: 7). In other words, 
the costs and time required to comply with the principle of sound financial 
management must not eliminate or overly diminish the benefits of the very 
operation it is providing finance for. In order to better understand this relationship, 
we will check where the inefficiencies in terms of timing and costs come from. 
2. The issue of the relationship between the implementing and supervisory bodies 
involved in Cohesion policy implementation. In a multilevel governance context, 
the complexity of the systems and processes can increase dramatically if their 
jurisdictions, daily activities and understanding of the policy objectives are not 
fully in line and coordinated. 
4.5.1 Timing problem 
There seems to be general agreement that timing is a serious problem in Cohesion policy. 
The ÖIR (2003) study publishes a number of statements to support such a conclusion: e.g. 
only 29% of respondents agree that the decision on approval of programmes, programme 
complements and transfer of payments is taken promptly; that only 35% of respondents find 
the Structural Funds implementation system to be efficient; and that only 43% of 
respondents believe that “the time taken from application to approval is not excessive” 
(ibid., 73). We have asked a similar question in our questionnaire, namely “to what extent 
do time management problems in project approval and implementation phases represent a 
problem” on a scale between 0 and 10. The average response was 7.5 without a significant 
variation, which confirms that time management is indeed a problem and this conclusion 
holds both for EU12 as well as EU15 Member States.  
Our interest, however, lies more in identifying what phases are, to the greatest extent, 
responsible for such a situation. The most significant reason in the EU12 Member States 
seems to be hidden in the inefficiency of the public administration, especially their 
inexperience (average score 7.4), while their inefficient operation15 is deemed as 
somewhat less problematic, although still rather severe (average score 6.5). Public 
administration in the EU15 Member States is not considered to be so problematic (average 
scores 5.6 and 4.8 respectively), which again confirms that there is a learning period 
needed for efficient implementation on the side of administration. Apart from the 
administration the most significant factor for delays in the implementation seems to come 
from “long internal administrative procedures due to national requirements” (average score 
7.2), which is noticeably higher than for the “long administrative procedures due to EU 
requirements” (average score 6.1). Contrary to the conclusion from Section 4.1.1 (that on 
                                                 
15 The question asked was whether the reason for time management problems lies in: “Public 
administration has the experience, but is inefficient in itself (low motivation,...)”. 
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average 55% of the administrative procedures are estimated to be due to EU legislation), it 
seems that, in terms of timing, it is particularly national administrative procedures that 
are problematic. In this framework, most criticism is attributed to “overly complex inter-
departmental/inter-institutional coordination requirements” (average score 6.9) and, 
especially in the EU15 Member States, also to the “unclear procedures and rules” (average 
score of 7.1 for the EU15 and 6.3 for the EU12 Member States). This seems to confirm the 
findings from the previous studies that time inefficiency is closely related to the 
involvement of too many institutions in the implementation and controls, giving rise to 
problems of different interpretations and, in certain cases, also different 
administrative/reporting requirements, as commented by one of the respondents. Finally, 
it was also the “inability of decision makers to decide“ which fitted in the first group of 
time inefficiency factors, with an average score of 6.4, and with no significant variation 
between the EU12 and EU15 Member States. It is also interesting to note that, in terms of 
the institutional approach to implementation, it seems that regionalised systems (both 
concentrated and de-concentrated) are particularly susceptible to the problem of unclear 
rules and procedures (average scores 7.5 and 7.4 respectively). Regionalised, de-
concentrated systems, however, seem to exhibit more efficient decision-making (average 
score 5.4 vs. 6.4 on average) and, interestingly, seem to have fewer problems with 
coordination (average score 5.0 vs. 6.9 on average). 
First in the second group of time inefficiency factors was “budgetary procedures and 
provisions” (average score 5.7), followed by “legal complaints” (average score 4.9) and 
“lobbying of the pressure groups” (average score 4.1). The only note-worthy difference 
between the EU12 and EU15 Member States could be found in difficulties due to legal 
complaints with the EU12 countries having an average score much higher than the average 
(5.4), whereas, in terms of institutional approach to implementation, it was especially 
respondents from regionalised de-concentrated systems who did not find legal complaints 
as problematic (average score 1.6). 
Without having analysed the problems related to controls, we can nevertheless draw some 
conclusions. The problem of timing does not seem to be as much related to the decision-
making process per se, but rather with the procedures and requirements that need to be 
dealt with by the administrations: financial management and controls clearly being of 
central importance. The roots for this can be found in inexperienced administration where 
systems are being newly introduced. Universally, however, their time-inefficiency seems to 
be predominantly caused by the rules set by the Member States themselves. The 
procedures should be as straightforward, short and adapted to the needs of the 
beneficiaries as possible; results seem to indicate however, that standardisation and 
low number of involved institutions is more conducive for such an implementing 
structure.  
4.5.2 Management and administration costs 
In terms of administration costs it is very hard to make generalised observations since there 
are notorious difficulties in getting comparable data. The study by ÖIR (2003) has come to 
the conclusion that there are significant differences in costs from one programme to 
another. These do not seem to be correlated with the type of administrative system, type 
European Policy Research Paper, No 64 53 European Policies Research Centre 
The Micro-efficiency of EU Cohesion Policy  
of programme or relative size of the programmes and therefore other factors seem to be at 
work (ÖIR 2003: 119). Boeckhout et al (2002: 16) have found that “staffing requirements 
are relatively modest in the fields of infrastructure (roughly € 15 million per staff member), 
moderate in the case of business support (about €3 to €5 million per staff member), and 
high in human resource development or small-scale farm support (up to €0.1 million per 
staff member for the latter). More important than looking at the exact number of how 
much one administrator can manage per year (data namely differ enormously with different 
authors, e.g. Horvat, 2005), it is worth highlighting their eventual conclusion, that it is not 
the funding level that seems to be decisive for staffing requirements, but the number of 
projects. The reason for this is that every project, irrespective of size and type, needs to 
be processed through more-or-less the same procedures and requirements. 
The same conclusion can be made on the basis of the data, which were collected by the 
informal group of the EU12 Member States that met in March 2007 in Bled, Slovenia. This 
again reveals large variations among the individual Member States. What is instructive, 
however, is that there seems to be a consistent pattern in terms of staffing requirements 
by Fund. If operations financed under European Social Fund are taken as a benchmark, then 
the data suggests that the European Agricultural (EAGGF) and the Fisheries Fund (FIFG) 
required almost twice as many personnel for their management - exactly 90% more. The 
European Regional Development Fund, on the other hand, requires, on average, 22% less, 
and the Cohesion Fund a massive 88% less. Taking into account the types of operations 
these Funds finance, it can be said that these results fully comply with the findings of the 
ÖIR (2003) study. 
In our questionnaire, we additionally asked what respondents believed was the maximum 
still-acceptable level of management costs for the administrative body implementing 
Cohesion policy, and what is the maximum acceptable level of administration costs for the 
project holder. The results reveal that the still-acceptable level of management costs for 
the administration were, on average, estimated to be 6.9% of the programme value16, while 
the administration costs for the project-holder should, on average, not exceed 8.8%. Thus, 
even though the two bases of calculating costs are not fully comparable (programme costs 
vs. project costs), we could say that on average respondents believe that total 
administration costs of Cohesion policy should not surpass roughly 15% of total costs. In 
quantitative terms for the 2007-2013 period, assuming the minimum possible co-financing 
rate of 15%, which indeed is unrealistically low due to revenue-generating projects 
provisions, PPPs, etc., these costs amount to €61 billion and every percentage point 
reduction in administration costs would save more than €4 billion. This represents a 
significant amount which, if it could be brought down, would noticeably improve the 
overall efficiency of Cohesion policy.  
In determining the consequences for implementation systems, we first need to realise that 
Cohesion policy resources form only part of a broader development policy which regions 
                                                 
16 It should be added that a few respondents have differentiated the maximum administration costs by 
the operational programme size. 
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and Member States pursue. According to the Fourth Cohesion Report, “between 2000 and 
2006, transfers from the Funds amounted, on average, to an estimated 60% or so of total 
public capital expenditure in Portugal, 48% in Greece and 24% in Spain”, while “transfers to 
Italy, Germany and Ireland are estimated at around 9.0% of public investment” (European 
Commission 2007: 143). Secondly, the administration costs are, on average, lower for the 
implementation of national policies only, which is due to the multilevel governance 
framework, additional administrative requirements, additional controls, etc.  
In such a setup, regions and Member States have two non-exclusive strategies for how to 
optimise the impact of available resources. First, as already argued in section 4.4.3(vi), in 
order to support the kind of operations that are predominantly characterised by smaller 
projects, it is of paramount importance that the implementation systems are made as lean 
and efficient as possible. Taking into account the findings from that section we could add, 
not just that only parts of small projects which are easy to implement and control should 
actually be financed by EU resources, but also that the principle of proportionality should 
be widely used in order to bring down costs. This principle has been introduced in the 
Regulations (Art. 13 of the general regulation), however it is still rather unclear how 
extensively it will be used, or rather how extensively the control and audit institutions will 
allow it to be implemented. 
Should proportionality not be used so extensively, the regions and Member States would 
increase the overall impact of their public incentives, if they would use Cohesion policy 
predominantly to finance operations, which are cheaper to implement while the rest 
would be financed through national policies only. This would significantly change the 
intervention structure of the EU resources (towards larger investment predominantly 
financed through ERDF and Cohesion Fund). The overall strategy would, however, remain 
unaffected since the part left out of the Cohesion policy would be taken over by the 
national policies. Such a commitment could be contract-based or established on the basis of 
the open method of coordination approach.  Although there would be clear and measurable 
benefits in terms of overall impact, the political acceptability of such an approach would 
be highly questionable on the part of the European Commission. 
4.5.3 Legality & regularity vs. efficiency & effectiveness: the right 
balance 
On the one hand, ÖIR (2003) points out that “there is universal acceptance of the need for 
a strong system of financial control” and also that “overall, there are no fundamental 
objections to the methods that are used” (ibid., 142). Thus, taking into account the multi-
level governance context and the given division of responsibilities, a proper system of 
checks and balances must be ensured. There seem to be significant doubts, on the other 
hand, as to what extent the principle of the European Court of Auditors - that “the overall 
cost of controls should be in proportion to the overall benefits they bring in both monetary 
and political terms” (European Court of Auditors, 2004: 2) - is in fact complied with.  
In the questionnaire, we investigated whether or not respondents believed that Cohesion 
policy implementation systems were over or under-controlled. There was universal 
agreement that the systems are over-controlled (average score 6.9). There was no 
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significant variation between where the respondents come from, geographically or 
institutionally. We furthermore wanted to get an insight into what level is responsible for 
such a conclusion. As it turns out, it is both the EU and the national level that seems to 
be responsible for over-controlling: almost two-thirds and three-quarters of all 
respondents believe there is over-control at the EU and national level respectively. This 
result is not surprising, taking into account the number of levels and institutions involved in 
controls.  
Each item of expenditure is initially inspected by the responsible person, and subsequently 
controlled by another person, whose functions are separated by regulations (controls are 
both administrative as well as on-the-spot, Commission Regulation No. 1828/2006). If there 
are more layers in the management systems, higher-level institutions must exert additional 
sample controls of the lower-level intermediate bodies, in order to make sure that their 
management and control systems function properly. After being verified by at least two 
‘pairs of eyes’ and by an additional sample-based control in multilevel management 
systems, declared expenditures are again checked (also on a sample basis) by the certifying 
authority. On top of the above-mentioned controls, public institutions are usually subject to 
internal control requirements, which represent an additional level of control. At the third 
stage, the correctness of expenditures is verified by the European Commission officials, on 
the basis of which the money is actually disbursed.  This also marks the end of the internal 
control mechanisms and the start of the following round of verification - external auditing. 
There are again numerous institutions responsible for doing audits. First, the national audit 
authority, then the national Courts of Auditors, while on the European level there are 
audits of the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and, additionally, there 
is OLAF, the European Anti-Fraud Office who can conduct their own investigations. Thus, 
overall, there are more-or-less ten steps of verifications and controls that each 
expenditure is, or at least can be (due to sampling) subjected to. To make the whole 
system worse, “there is no formal requirement for control bodies to coordinate the 
planning of these checks or to take into account the checks made by the others” (European 
Court of Auditors 2004: 7). However, the new 2007-2013 regulations do give more attention 
to providing tools that could be used to improve coordination (e.g. the audit strategy as 
foreseen in Art. 61 of the general regulation). 
In spite of these massive (and increasingly extended) control system requirements, 
however, the European Court of Auditors still found control failures in all of the audited 
programmes (European Court of Auditors 2006: 128), thus indicating that, since no obvious 
improvement seems to be established during the years, other problems must be involved. A 
study by the European Court of Auditors (2004), found the biggest weaknesses of the system 
in: (1) unclear and inconsistent objectives of the policies; (2) lack of coordination of the 
involved institutions; (3) absence of information on costs and benefits of control and audit 
operations; and (4) inconsistent application of the approach taken, extent, timing, 
coverage, margins and follow-up. The ÖIR (2003) study, on the other hand, identifies as the 
biggest problem the duplication of systems, (especially the problem of reinterpretation of 
the national decisions on the European level) which creates uncertainties, an assessment 
that our analysis fully supports. They also find it to be a regular practice that “the same 
institutions are controlled several times, each time from different institutions, with each 
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applying slightly different rationales” (ibid., 106). An, at least partial, answer to this 
problem in the 2007-2013 regulations might lie in the decentralisation of eligibility rules to 
the national level, as stipulated in Article 56 of the general regulation. As already 
mentioned, it remains to be seen how this provision will be reconciled with the provision 
that the European Commission remains ultimately responsible for the regularity of 
structural operations expenditure. Apart from the duplication problem, there are reports 
that “controls are very time consuming”, that they “are considered to keep the 
implementing bodies and MAs from doing their actual work”, and that “the cost-benefit 
ratio from control procedures ... does not make sense” (ÖIR, 2003: 106). 
Different assessment of the problem requires different remedies. In order to reduce the 
complexity of the control systems, two approaches could be conceived. First, there could 
be a modification of the way controls are being performed and/or second, the number of 
institutions involved in this process could be reduced, resulting in a considerable reduction 
in the complexity of the system, as well as in a reduced uncertainty problem due to multi-
level governance problem.  
As far as the former approach is concerned, there is certainly significant scope for 
optimisation in the manner controls and audits are performed. The starting point in this 
regard should be the proposition that “there is no overall vision or coordination of the many 
and varied systems” (European Court of Auditors, 2004: 6). In such a context, it is clearly 
all but impossible consistently to determine the reasonable assurance on the legality and 
regularity of transactions, because every control institution has an inbuilt incentive to ‘play 
it safe', i.e. to interpret the regulatory environment in a rigid and formalistic manner. 
Through time this gives rise to working practices that put “more focus on procedures 
rather then on content” (Wostner 2007: 10), a common observation made by all the EU12 
Member States at their informal meeting in Slovenia. The same problem was also 
recognised by the EU15 Member States, i.e. that due to fear of irregularities Cohesion 
policy uses an overcautious approach (ÖIR, 2003). It was also voiced at the Santander, 
Spain, seminar of 9 July 2007 on “Present and future of regional policies”, namely that it is 
the risk-averse practices that represent the biggest challenge for more efficient 
implementation systems. Such an approach can ultimately lead to verification practices, 
whereby the impact of the disbursed resources becomes irrelevant as long as Member 
States have abided by the rules, while the implementation system would remain very 
complex and costly. Clearly, although this is an exaggeration, it does point to the danger 
the system could end up in if appropriate measures to reverse the present trend were not 
introduced. These include, amongst others, measures that would strengthen the mutual 
trust of the institutions involved. It needs to be recognised that a system such as Cohesion 
policy is “only tenable in a polity with high levels of mutual trust ....” (Hooghe, 1996:117). 
Thus, taking all of the above-mentioned into account, the new approach for the 2007-2013 
period, together with the European Commission’s initiative of the so called “contracts of 
confidence”, seems to be a step in the right direction. The new system requires the 
national audit authorities to prepare an audit strategy, which will specify the bodies to be 
audited, methods to be used, sampling methods, indicative planning of what shall be done 
when, etc. Should this ex-ante coordination work also be used to address the above- 
mentioned problems, if necessary also in the contract of confidence, then this could 
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represent the basis for (in time) more streamlined management and control systems. The 
Commission already made clear in 2002 that “where [the Commission] has confidence in the 
effectiveness of the management and audit system in a Member State or region, the level 
of auditing which it needs to undertake can be reduced” (European Commission, 2003: 10). 
One possible snag of this approach, of course, is that contracts of confidence could, in 
practice, also make national control and audit institutions more, and not less, rigid than 
they are at present.  
There are, however, reasons to expect that the possible improvements based on the 
contracts of confidence approach, which in principle could be introduced immediately, 
would be limited, due to the restrictive provisions set by Cohesion policy’s regulatory 
environment. Thus, a more significant departure from the present concept of how Cohesion 
policy is implemented was proposed by the Estonian delegation at the Maribor conference 
on the future of Cohesion policy, organised by the Slovenian Presidency in April 200817. The 
proposal rests on the idea that disbursement of funds should be based on agreed 
outcomes and results instead of verification of invoices. Such an approach has merit, in 
particular with regard to reorientation of focus from legality and regularity to efficiency 
and effectiveness, while at the same time also significantly reducing the administrative 
burden (since there would be no need any more to verify each and every single invoice). 
The challenge remaining to be solved is whether such an approach could be applied to all 
types of operations financed under Cohesion policy (e.g. infrastructure) and, secondly, how 
could uncertainty due to ex-post ‘reinterpretation and questioning’ of the ex-ante agreed 
outcomes by the auditors (potentially also resulting in money recoveries) be avoided. 
Hence, additionally or complementary to the possible improvements presented thus far, the 
use of the second approach also seems necessary - i.e. improvement of the implementation 
and control systems based on a reduced number of involved institutions, in particular in 
the relationship between the Member States and the European level. Within this 
framework, the first option would be in institutional merging of the national and European 
Courts of Auditors, on the one hand, and of European Commission and national audit 
authorities on the other. This would not just reduce the number of involved institutions but 
would, consequently, also reduce the problem of reinterpreting the rules due to the multi-
level governance structure. That being said, this scenario could prove hard to put into 
practice, especially due to legal considerations, the independence requirements, etc. 
Therefore, a better solution might be found in the way that Cohesion policy is being 
conceived. There are two fundamental principles of public policy and fiscal federalism 
theories that underpin the functioning of Cohesion policy. First, there is the generally 
accepted notion that one of the functions that should be performed at the central level is 
(financial) redistribution. Thus, this principle, by definition, supports Cohesion policy’s 
positioning at the EU level. At the same time, however, the principle of subsidiarity argues 
                                                 
17 For more details refer to the presentation ‘13 Estonian contribution to the debate CFCP Slovenia 
April 2008’ accessible at http://www.svlr.gov.si/en/eu_presidency/events/ 
conference_on_the_future_of_cohesion_policy/  
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in favour of decision-making at the levels where costs and benefits accrue (see Section 
4.3.2), i.e. at the Member State or regional level. In areas with high aid intensities, where 
Cohesion policy resources, therefore, represent a large share of public resources, there 
could be an accountability reservation to full application of the subsidiarity principle, 
since, in these areas, costs would be covered by taxpayers outside of the benefit area. This 
could be mitigated with lower co-financing rates. In such a setting, however, Cohesion 
policy could be conceived as a bulk transfer of investment-conditioned financial 
resources, where full responsibility for the legality, regularity, efficiency and 
effectiveness would be entirely transferred to the Member State/regional level. An EU 
perspective would continue to be ensured through very strategic “programme(s)”18, which 
would be prepared by the recipient areas and agreed with the European Commission. 
Furthermore, the Commission would continue to monitor the progress made by the Member 
States (e.g. on the basis of core indicators and financial indicators), which would allow 
monitoring and evaluation of Cohesion policy impact as a whole. Such an approach to 
Cohesion policy implementation could be termed as “coordinated full decentralisation”, 
which would preserve Cohesion policy as a genuine European policy, but would, at the same 
time, radically reduce Cohesion policy administration costs, without any detriment to the 
effectiveness of the used resources. In fact, it could be argued, both on the basis of theory 
and the answers of our respondents from practice (overwhelming support for further 
decentralisation) that the impact of Cohesion policy would actually improve. 
4.6 Monitoring and evaluation 
4.6.1 Efficiency principles 
The importance of monitoring and evaluation is presented as one of the basic principles and 
value added of Cohesion policy. Empirical studies show, however, that there is a rather 
limited translation of findings into policy-making. For example, the ÖIR (2003) study found 
limited support (57%) for the notion that “evaluation system is seen to be necessary and to 
work well”, and even less (43%) for the notion that “the interaction/integration between 
management and monitoring is seen as efficient”. On the other hand, Polverari et al (2007) 
report that the long-term trend in the complexity, as well as applicability, of the 
monitoring and evaluation systems is encouraging. According to them, the first financial 
perspective after the 1988 reform saw a very modest introduction of the monitoring and 
evaluation systems, which provided evaluations “of a low quality” and “lacking 
methodological rigour” (ibid., 5), also due to “widespread lack of monitoring data”, which 
was “particularly acute at the regional level” (ibid., 5). Through time, the monitoring and 
evaluation systems became more complex, computerised and, by the 2000-2006 period, 
also increasingly starting to use internet-based platforms. In this period, however, the 
legislation was rather prescriptive (ex-ante, mid-term, ex-post framework), which was later 
considered as a weakness. Thus, for the 2007-2013 period, more focus was given to 
                                                 
18 The specificity of such a programme should be lower than the current National Strategic Reference 
Frameworks, which often already specify rather concretely the foreseen operations. 
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“strategic, results oriented approach based on flexible and needs based evaluations” (ibid., 
vii).  
Such an approach gives Member States a lot of flexibility. As a result, they need to give due 
attention to a number of efficiency principles. The monitoring and evaluation systems 
should be integrated in the policy cycle, which means that the monitoring and evaluation 
systems need to be designed in line with the prevailing institutional setup for Cohesion 
policy. In terms of evaluation design, three approaches have been defined (Polverari et al, 
2007: 1) a national approach used in centralised systems; (2) a guided approach with weak 
central coordination function but decentralised implementation; and (3) a regional 
approach, characterised by total decentralisation of monitoring and evaluation. Even 
though the monitoring and evaluation design is, of course, subordinate to the general 
implementation systems structure, there seems to be a trend towards (at least) a 
strengthened central coordination function and greater standardisation. Whatever the 
implementation system, Member States themselves can decide on the design of the 
monitoring system. This can be integrated (one system for multiple programmes and 
regions), or fragmented (one system per region and/or programme). The advantage of the 
latter is that it allows for needs-based, tailor-made solutions, which also make it more 
adaptable. The former, however, sets minimum standards, which can contribute to a 
system’s quality, allow aggregation of data, and savings due to economies of scale, and, 
finally, integrated frameworks promoting exchange of information, all of which can 
contribute to greater quality of monitoring systems. Looking at the trends, it seems that, if 
properly managed, the benefits of the former tend to outweigh the benefits of the latter 
(ibid.). Finally, in order to ensure accountability and legitimacy of the interventions, a 
monitoring system needs to comply with the transparency criterion, so that the data 
collected are methodologically sound, correct, timely and, thus, ultimately also 
trustworthy.  
The second important efficiency dimension in monitoring and evaluation is the “pragmatic 
approach”, used because over-ambitious approaches tend to have negative consequences 
(ÖIR, 2003). Monitoring and evaluation systems, in order to make sense, need to bring 
“value-for-money”. Collecting and analysing data namely creates costs both for the 
beneficiaries and the administration As a result, processes need to be streamlined and data 
collected only for exactly defined purposes. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to 
establish a clear vision and focus for monitoring and evaluation, as it is only on this basis 
that practical information and results without administrative overload will be collected and 
fed into the policy cycle. That being said, it is increasingly recognised (Polverari et al, 
2007) that the crucial quality-determining factor for monitoring and evaluation is the 
quality of the data collected at the project level. This also institutionally needs to be fed 
into the monitoring system as close to the project itself as possible, otherwise it is 
increasingly hard to ensure the correctness of the data. Of course, monitoring systems 
should have in-built quality control systems. These can, however, never replace first-hand 
knowledge of the project. In the framework of the pragmatic approach, it is also necessary 
to point out the principle of proportionality, since smaller projects clearly are much more 
sensitive to the administrative burdens associated with monitoring than larger projects, 
where greater monitoring requirements are not just feasible, but also justified. 
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4.6.2 Partnership 
Partnership was also one of the fundamental principles introduced following the reform of 
the Structural Funds in 1988 and its scope has been broadened ever since. The first 1989-
1993 programming period saw the introduction of monitoring committees, which “came to 
play a key role in reprogramming of CSFs and OPs ... as well as providing an input into some 
of the evaluations carried...” (Polverari et al, 2007: 4). In the subsequent programming 
periods, their jurisdiction was extended as far as approval of selection criteria and 
modifications of implementing provisions. This is not surprising from the perspective that 
the partnership principle has always been intended to cover all stages, from programme 
preparation to implementation to monitoring and evaluation. It is remarkable, however, 
that monitoring committees managed to acquire such power even though they were 
increasingly set up from economic, social, regional and other representatives, which was, in 
effect, only possible to the detriment of the decision-making powers of the official 
authorities. 
There seems to be an undisputed value added in strong partnership. The ÖIR (2003) study, 
for example, found 73% support for the idea that a “monitoring committee is necessary for 
the efficient implementation of the Structural Funds” (ibid., 67). There is, however, 
significantly greater scepticism as to the effectiveness of the present arrangement, since 
just over half (55%) of questionnaire respondents believe, not just that a monitoring 
committee is necessary, but also that it works well. This can, to a great extent, be 
explained by “the lack of total real involvement of the social partners in genuine decision 
making and implementation” (ibid., 75).  
Optimal arrangements for cooperation between administrative bodies and partners are 
clearly dependent on the institutional and historical practices of different regions and 
Member States. There are common lessons, however, with regard to identification of those 
phases of the policy cycle where the partnership principle brings the highest added value. 
This is important to be aware of, because it gives guidance to the administrations as to 
where additional effort in cooperation with the partners is necessary. This, in turn, would 
improve partners’ ownership of the programme and thus also the effectiveness of 
monitoring committees’ functioning. According to our respondents, the three most 
important phases, with the greatest value added for partners’ involvement, are 
programming (average score 8.2), strategic monitoring (average score 6.8) and evaluation 
(average score 6.3). There is less support for partners involvement in the definition of 
implementing provisions - for example calls for projects - (average score 5.8), as well as for 
the definition of administrative procedures and regular, operational monitoring (both with 
an average score of 5.6). Thus, according to our findings, administrations and managing 
authorities should attach most attention to developing close relationships with the partners 
in programming, strategic monitoring and evaluation. This, in turn, suggests that 
monitoring committees should primarily be involved in strategic issues and not get 
involved in operational matters. This casts some doubt on the present requirement that 
monitoring committees “shall consider and approve the criteria for selecting the 
operations” (Art. 65 of the general regulation). On average, it seems to be difficult to 
expect enough specialised know-how among the committee members on operational issues; 
furthermore, partners could also potentially be faced with a conflict of interest. Under the 
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conditions stated above, and with an attitude of genuine cooperation from the managing 
authorities, the partnership principle rightly represents one of the building blocks of 
Cohesion policy implementation. This is also demonstrated by high approval rates among 
the respondents with regards to strategic issues. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has addressed the issue of micro-efficiency in Cohesion policy, a factor 
determined by the institutional or absorption capacity of recipient regions and Member 
States which, in turn, co-determine the macro-economic impact of Cohesion policy. The 
paper set out systematically to analyse the choices recipient Member States and regions 
face when deciding on the implementation system. In doing this, they are restricted by the 
regulatory framework agreed at the EU level, which, according to our findings, is 
responsible for 55% of the administrative procedures. The EU regulatory framework, 
therefore, plays a prominent role with regard to possible improvements of the system. On 
the other hand, the remaining 45% of the administrative procedures are due to 
national/regional requirements. The challenge in making generalised observations about 
them is that the institutional and legal setup of recipient Member States is immensely 
diverse, necessitating the use of either the relevant typologies of approaches or horizontal 
guiding principles.  
The paper presents a systematic analysis of the properties of different implementation 
systems, with regard to their contribution to the micro-efficiency of Cohesion policy. In 
doing so, a strong conclusion emerges: the implementation systems, together with the 
regulatory framework, not only need simplification, but proper change. This conclusion 
is not based solely on the finding of the European Court of Auditors, who have reported 
control failures in all of the audited programmes, but also on the fact that: (a) time needed 
from the project idea to the project start in a modern, globalized world is unacceptably 
long; in fact, time management in general represents a fundamental weakness of the 
Cohesion policy implementation systems; (b) there is a universal agreement that the system 
is over-controlled, which holds true both at the national and EU levels; and (c) the 
management costs on the side of administration and project-holders were estimated to be 
as high as 15% of total costs, which would translate to a soaring €61 billion over the 
financial perspective, and potential savings of €4 billion for every percentage point 
reduction in administration costs. 
Four proposals for improvements have been put forward. The most radical of them, the 
“coordinated full de-centralisation”, conceives Cohesion policy as a bulk transfer of 
investment-conditioned financial resources, where full responsibility for the legality, 
regularity, efficiency and effectiveness would be entirely transferred to the Member 
State/regional level while, at the same time, preserving Cohesion policy as a genuine 
European policy. The analysis furthermore reveals that: the subsidiarity principle is still not 
taken into account to a satisfactory degree; that experience and political context have 
significant influence on the (optimal) design of implementation systems; and, finally, that, 
on average, there seems to be merit in concentration, both with regards to the number of 
operational programmes (less so for their thematic focus), as well as the number of 
institutions involved in the implementation systems, horizontally and especially vertically. 
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7.  ANNEX - QUESTIONNAIRE 
Remark: Questions one to six and eight are not addressed in this paper as they will be 
dealt with in a separate paper. 
I. COHESION POLICY RATIONALE 
 














0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
 
2. Should Cohesion policy provide income transfers or should it provide resources for 
productive investment (please, place ”X” in the appropriate box)? 
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
Income transfers 
           
Resources for 
productive investment 
Example: the mix of 7:3 would indicate that Cohesion policy should provide 70% of 
resources for income transfers and 30% for productive investment. 
 
 
3. What do you feel should be the focus / objective of Cohesion policy (please divide 
100 points between the following objectives): 
 
Economic growth and economic competitiveness  
  
Job creation  
  
Balanced regional development  
  
Environmental sustainability  
  
Social sustainability  
  
Support for overcoming temporary shocks  
  
Support for structural adjustment  
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Urban development  
  
Rural development  
  
Preventing depopulation of peripheral areas  
  
Other (please specify):_____________________  
  




4. What should be the eligible area (you can ”X”s more then one box)? 
 
Country level  
  
Macro-regions level (East-Germany, South Italy,...)  
  
NUTS II regions  
  
NUTS III regions  
  
Other (please specify):__________________________  
 
 
5. What criteria should be taken into account for the allocation of Cohesion policy 
resources (please divide 100 points between the following criteria)? 
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GDP / GNI per capita  
  
Employment level  
  
Unemployment level  
  
Population density  
  
Innovation criteria (R&D, patents,...)  
  
Education criteria  
  
Social criteria (poverty levels,...)  
  
Territorial criteria (island, rural, mountainous areas,...)  
  
Prosperity of the neighbouring regions  
  
Other (please specify): __________________________  
 TOTAL = 100 
 
 
6. Would you say there exists a maximum level of transfers from funds supporting 
cohesion to a Member State/Region (as % of GDP) beyond which Cohesion policy 
can no longer be efficient? 
 
No    
    
Yes  If so, what would this limit be in % of GDP:  
 
 
7. Would you say there exists a critical minimum level of resources per operational 
programme (in million € per year) below which present Cohesion policy approach 
is no longer justified? 
 
No    
    
Yes  If so, what would this limit be in million € per 
year: 
 
    
  Below 10 million € per year  
    
  Between 10 and 20 million € per year  
    
  Between €20 and €40 million per year  
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  Between €40 and €70 million per year  
    
  Above €70 million per year  
    
 
 
8. To what extent do you support the logic and rationale of (on a scale between 0 - 
not at all - and 10 - totally): 
 
Convergence objective  
  
Regional competitiveness and employment objective  
  
Territorial coop.: cross-border cooperation  
  
Territorial coop.: trans-national cooperation  
  





9. How do you feel about Cohesion policy regulations and the Community Strategic 
Guidelines in terms of Member States’ flexibility for deciding the scope of 












0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
What areas of intervention (or eligibility) are you 
missing: 
What areas of intervention (or eligibility) 
would you eliminate: 
o  o  
o  o  
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10. For a given Member States, would you render as more efficient a more centralised 
approach with smaller number of operational programmes or more decentralised  
approach with greater number of OPs? 
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
Centralised with small 
number of OPs 
           
Decentralised with 
greater number of OPs 
 
Example: the mix of 7:3 would indicate that in your opinion centralised approach tends to 
be more efficient in 7 out of 10 cases. The same logic applies to the next question. 
 
 
11. Regional operational programmes (separate OPs for each region) vs. integrated 
regional programmes (one OP for more regions prepared on the basis of regional 
input, but managed at the national level): in terms of absorption and impact, 
which works better?  
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
Regional Operational 
Programmes 
           
Integrated regional 
programmes 
             
 
 
12. To what extent, in your estimation, is operational programmes planning (policy-
mix), determined by the Member States/regions, and how much by the 
Commission? And what is, in your opinion, the optimal balance?  
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
ACTUAL            ACTUAL 
Determined by Member 
States 
           
Determined by the 
European Commission 
OPTIMAL            OPTIMAL 
Determined by Member 
States 
           
Determined by the 
European Commission 
(Example: the mix of 7:3 would indicate that 70% is / should be determined by Member 
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13. In the planning of operational programmes should operations be concentrated on 





nor broad  
Broad 
coverage 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
On the basis of which criteria, in your opinion, should operations be selected (on a scale 
between 0 - not relevant - and 10 - criteria should have a major)? 
Priority fields as defined at the national / regional level: greatest expected impact   
  
Priority fields as defined at the EU level  
  
Catalytic effect (operations which would not have happened without the support of 
the EU funds) 
 
  
Complementarity among operations (synergies)  
  
Other available sources of funding, especially EU  
  
EU co-financing rates  
  
Operations should have quick and predictable absorption capacity  
  
Administrative costs of operations  
  
Operations should have measurable and visible results  
  
Deadweight / displacement / substitution effects of operations  
  
Positive externalities of operations  
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III. PROJECT GENERATION, APPRAISAL AND SELECTION 
 
14. To what extent is project selection performed on the national and how much on 
the regional / local level? And what is, in your opinion, the optimal balance?  
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
ACTUAL            ACTUAL 
Selection on the national 
level 
           
Selection on the 
regional / local level 
OPTIMAL            OPTIMAL 
Selection on the national 
level 
           
Selection on the 
regional / local level 
(Example: the mix of 7:3 would indicate that 70% is / should be selected on the national 
level and 30% by the regional / local level) 
 
 
15. In your opinion, what kind of a call for projects delivers better results: 
− open ones, which enable more innovative approaches by the applicants and give 
more flexibility to those appraising the projects or  
− restricted ones, which define more precisely what exactly the administration wants 
and allow for a more formal appraisal? 
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
Open call for projects 
bring better results            
Restricted calls for 
projects bring better 
results 
(Example: the mix of 7:3 would indicate that open calls tend to deliver better results in 7 
out of 10 cases.) 
 
 
16. What kind of project appraisal and selection, in your opinion, comes closest to 
selecting the best available projects (on a scale between 0 - “project quality is 
predominantly neglected” - and 10 - “project quality plays a decisive role”):  
 
Government (national, regional) decision  
  








Decision by the MA/IB based on recommendation from a multi-departmental selection 
committee, which also includes external independent experts 
 
  
European Policy Research Paper, No 64 75 European Policies Research Centre 
The Micro-efficiency of EU Cohesion Policy  
Decision by the MA/IB based on recommendation from a multi-departmental selection 
committee, which also includes  external independent experts, including foreign ones 
 
 
To what extent does European Commission’s project approval (major projects) contribute 





17. In your experience, what is the time scale for getting from a project idea to the 
start of the project implementation in case of (in months):  
 
Major infrastructure project  
  
Smaller infrastructure project  
  
Productive investment project  
  
Human resources project  
 
 
18. Is there enough qualified firms in the market providing services for the 
preparation of project applications, project management and project 
documentation (on a scale between 0 - “the market is seriously underdeveloped“- 




IV. IMPLEMENTING STRUCTURE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROLS 
 
19. Would you support the notion that above the responsible line-ministries (either in 
the function of managing authorities or intermediate bodies) there should be an 






















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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20. In the framework of a particular operational programme, what type of approach 
would you consider as more efficient:  
− concentrated with a smaller number of intermediate bodies and implementing 
agencies or  
− d-econcentrated with a larger number of intermediate bodies and implementing 
agencies 
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
Concentrated             De-concentrated  
(Example: the mix of 7:3 would indicate that in your opinion concentrated OP 
implementation tends to be more efficient in 7 out of 10 cases.) 
 
 
21. Do you support the notion that public authorities should outsource the 
implementation to (on a scale between 0 - not at all - and 10 - totally): 
Specialised public bodies  
  
Private sector  
 
 
22. How would you describe the Cohesion policy management systems in terms of 











0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
On what level is it under-controlled  
(you can ”X” more then one): 
On what level is it over-controlled  
(you can ”X” more then one):: 
EU  EU  
National  National  
Regional / Local  Regional / Local  
 
 
23. To what extent do “time management problems” in project approval and 
implementation phases represent a problem (on a scale between 0 - “not at all” - 
and 10 - “very serious problems”): 
  
What would you say are the main reasons for this (mark each criterion on a scale between 
0 - not at all - and 10 - major importance): 
 
Inexperienced public administration  
  
Public administration has the experience, but is inefficient in itself (low motivation)  
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Unclear procedures and rules  
  
Inability of decision makers to decide  
  
Long administrative procedures due to EU requirements  
  
Long internal administrative procedures due to national requirements (permits)  
  
Overly complex interdepartmental / inter-institutional coordination requirements  
  
Lobbying of the pressure groups   
  
Budgetary procedures and provisions  
  
Legal complaints  
  






24. To what extent are, in your opinion, the administrative procedures for the 
absorption of funds related to EU / national legislation? 
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
Administrative 
procedures due to EU 
legislation 
           
Administrative 
procedures due to 
national legislation 
(Example: the mix of 7:3 would indicate that administrative procedures are 70% due to EU 
and 30% due to national legislation) 
 
25. What is, in your opinion, still an acceptable level of (expressed as % of available 
resources): 
 
Management costs in the public administration implementing the Cohesion 
policy? (as % of programme resources) 
 
  
Administration costs for the project holder  
(admin. costs at the project level for the recipient - as % of project value) 
 
European Policy Research Paper, No 64 78 European Policies Research Centre 
The Micro-efficiency of EU Cohesion Policy  
V. MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
 
26. In which phases does involvement of partners bring the highest value added -
partnership principle (mark each phase on a scale of 0 - no value added - to 10 - 
greatest value added)? 
 
Planning of operational programmes  
  
Definition of administrative procedures  
  
Strategic monitoring  
  
Definition of implementing provisions (calls for projects)   
  






27. In your opinion, how much of the Cohesion policy impact is determined by the 
quality/appropriateness of the operational programmes and how much by the more 
detailed provisions defined in the implementing provisions and structures (call for 
projects, administrative procedures...)? 
 
 10:0 9:1 8:2 7:3 6:4 5:5 4:6 3:7 2:8 1:9 0:10  
    
Determined by 
operational programmes 




provisions (calls for 
projects...) 
(Example: the mix of 7:3 would indicate that 70% of the impact is due to the 
quality/appropriateness of the OPs and 30% due to detailed implementing provision) 
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VI. RESPONDENT PROFILE 
 
Country:   _______________________________ 
 
Type of institution you are working in: 
 
European Commission  
  
Managing / Paying / Certifying / Audit Authority  
  
Ministry / intermediate body  
  
Implementing body / agency at national level  
  
Implementing body / agency at regional/local level including regional 
branch of national institutions 
 
  
Other (experts, private service providers, research...)  
 




Majority of my work is of strategic and / or management 
type (senior level) 
 
  












Less than 12 years  
  
High school  
  
University/College  
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Name (optional):     
 
Institution (optional):     
 




Thank you very much for your contribution. 
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